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FUNCTIONAL CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE
MIHAILIS E. DIAMANTIS*
ABSTRACT
The line between guilt and innocence often turns on what a de-
fendant knew. Although the law’s approach to knowledge may be
relatively straightforward for individuals, its doctrines for corporate
defendants are fraught with ambiguity and opportunities for games-
manship. Corporations can spread information thinly across em-
ployees so that it is never “known.” And prosecutors can exploit legal
uncertainties to bring knowledge-based charges where corporations
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were merely negligent in how they handled information. Whereas
knowledge as a mens rea has unique practical and normative prop-
erties that vary with a corporation’s size and industry, corporate law
treats knowledge just like any other mental state and uses the same
doctrine for all corporations. Commentators dissatisfied with that
doctrine have overlooked an obvious resource: social epistemology
(the formal study of group knowledge states). As a result, commenta-
tors have missed a crucial distinction—between knowledge and
information—at the root of ambiguities and inefficiencies in the law
and proposed reforms.
This Article is the first to draw on the tools of social epistemology
and organizational science to develop a functional theory of corporate
knowledge. Its goal is to validate the legislature’s frequent choice of
knowledge as a mens rea while also inducing corporations of all sorts
to process information at socially optimal levels. The incentives
corporations have to (mis)manage information, the public cost of
corporate crime, and the private cost of corporate compliance are
critical to the analysis. A functional approach to corporate knowledge
would eschew the binaries of current doctrine in favor of a sliding
test responsive to two factors: (1) “effort,” or the cost of information
management, and (2) “obviousness,” or how peer corporations would
perform with respect to the same information. The resulting theory
is flexible enough to fine-tune incentives for corporations of all sizes
and industries while also intuitively capturing what culpable
knowledge means in the corporate context.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose I hand you $1.61, $2.37, and $0.96. Do you have at least
five dollars? If you are like most people, you do not yet know. With
pen, paper, and a few seconds, you could add the numbers and find
that you have only $4.94. You had the information you needed but
did not at first know the answer.
Corporate law has yet to grapple with this intuitive distinction
between information and knowledge. The incentives corporations
have to implement the information-gathering compliance mech-
anisms they need to prevent misconduct turn on this distinction. So
does the difference between a justly punished corporation and a
casualty of prosecutorial or regulatory overreaching. As argued
below, current doctrines either treat no information within the cor-
porate structure as knowledge or risk treating it all as knowledge.
Neither extreme serves the interests of corporate law or justice.
Knowledge plays an important role in corporate liability.1 For
simplicity, this Article focuses on criminal liability, though its argu-
ments carry over with some modest modification to civil and reg-
ulatory contexts. Many of the most common white-collar crimes—
things such as false claims,2 mail and wire fraud,3 securities fraud,4
1. Though this Article focuses on the mens rea “knowledge,” it also has important impli-
cations for “recklessness,” which is defined as unjustifiably disregarding a known substantial
risk. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (defining recklessness in terms
of disregarding a known risk); see, e.g., State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 535 (N.H.
1997).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012) (criminalizing knowingly presenting a false claim to the
government). 
3. See id. § 1341 (criminalizing use of the mail system in furtherance of a scheme to de-
fraud); id. § 1343 (criminalizing use of a wire transmission in furtherance of a scheme to de-
fraud); United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting “scheme
to defraud” to require knowledge that a representation is false or misleading).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (criminalizing use of “manipulative or deceptive device[s]”
in the purchase or sale of a security); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 319 (2007) (“To establish liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must
prove that the defendant acted with scienter.” (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 193-94, n.12 (1976))); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2018) (criminalizing use of “any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud” in the purchase or sale of a security).
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money laundering,5 and tax fraud6—require that the defendant
acted knowingly. If corporate employees commit the proscribed
acts with the relevant knowledge, that can spell trouble for them
in their individual capacities.7 Prosecutors wanted to find out
which individuals knew about General Motor’s faulty ignition
switches8 or Volkswagen’s cheat devices9 in order to bring those
individuals to justice. But more than individual liability is at
stake. Under long-established law,10 the acts and knowledge of
employees are the acts and knowledge of their corporate em-
ployers.11 Corporations can be liable for the same crimes as
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (criminalizing transactions in property the defendant knew
was derived from unlawful activity).
6. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012) (“Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall ... be guilty of a
felony.”); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1991) (interpreting “willfully” in tax
fraud statute to require knowledge of tax provisions alleged to have been violated).
7. See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi et al., 6 Volkswagen Executives Charged as Company Pleads
Guilty in Emissions Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/
business/volkswagen-diesel-vw-settlement-charges-criminal.html [https://perma.cc/YDE5-
PGSV] (discussing the arrest of “[c]ompany executives [who] knew that the cars were
programmed to recognize when they were being tested and to deliver optimum pollution
readings, according to investigators. But rather than admit wrongdoing, Volkswagen
representatives provided false and misleading information for more than a year to the
California Air Resources Board and the Environmental Protection Agency”).
8. See Nathan Bomey & Kevin McCoy, GM Agrees to $900M Criminal Settlement over
Ignition-Switch Defect, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/cars/2015/09/17/gm-justice-department-ignition-switch-defect-settlement/
32545959 [https://perma.cc/6Y8F-J4GR] (“‘We’re not done, and it remains possible we will
charge an individual,’ [U.S. Attorney Preet] Bharara said at a news conference in New York.
‘If there is a way to bring a case like that, we will bring it.’”).
9. See Tabuchi et al., supra note 7 (“The Volkswagen case is also the first major test of
a Justice Department commitment to hold executives more accountable, even as the agency
braces for big changes in its top ranks under President-elect Donald J. Trump.”).
10. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909)
(“[There is] no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation
... shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom
it has intrusted authority to act.”).
11. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049,
2053-58 (2016) (discussing the unprincipled introduction and evolution of respondeat superior
in corporate criminal law).
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individuals.12 The prosecutors investigating individuals at General
Motors and Volkswagen were also after the companies themselves.13
The stakes for getting knowledge right in corporate criminal law
are high. On the one hand, an overly restrictive definition will make
it harder to prosecute corporate misconduct.14 Some estimates
already put the annual costs associated with white-collar crime in
the United States at around half a trillion dollars15 (just shy of
Sweden’s GDP),16 which is twenty times the total economic costs
associated with every other sort of crime in the United States.17 On
the other hand, an overly permissive definition of corporate knowl-
edge risks choking the corporate engines of our economy18 and dis-
couraging corporations from taking advantage of socially beneficial
economic opportunities.19 In addition, under a broad definition of
12. Criminal statutes tend to make it illegal for “people” to engage in specified behavior.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful ... for any person ... except a licensed
importer ... to ship, transport, or receive any ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce.”);
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ...
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance.”). The law then defines “person” to include corporations. See
1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
13. See Bomey & McCoy, supra note 8 (“General Motors agreed to pay $900 million as part
of a Justice Department investigation into its failure to fix a deadly ignition-switch defect
blamed for more than 120 deaths.”).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See RODNEY HUFF ET AL., THE 2010 NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 12 (2010), http://www.nw3c.org/docs/publications/2010-national-survey-on-white-collar-
crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G4U-9QS7].
16. See CIA, Sweden, THE WORLD FACTBOOK https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
resources/the-world-factbook/geos/sw.html [https://perma.cc/TDG2-HCDG].
17. Murder, the most costly offense category other than white-collar crime, costs the
United States $8,982,907 in 2008 (in 2008 dollars). See Kathryn E. McCollister et al., The Cost
of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation, 108
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 98, 100 (2010).
18. See William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 392,
423 (2017) (“Abolitionists of corporate criminal liability have for years bemoaned the immense
costs to innocents and significant externalities of criminal investigations, indictments, pros-
ecutions, and convictions against corporations.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-
28.1100 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-busi
ness-organizations#9-28.1100 [https://perma.cc/3L5Y-NAKN] (allowing prosecutors to factor
in the cost to society of a corporate prosecution when deciding whether to charge the cor-
poration).
19. See David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal
Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1254-55 (2016) (arguing that fear of reputational
harm resulting from a possible criminal conviction leads to an inefficient allocation of
resources).
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corporate knowledge, corporations would likely make wasteful
investments in excessive compliance.20 Corporate compliance costs
already rival total municipal policing costs.21 JPMorgan alone has
three times more compliance officers than the FBI has agents.22
Corporations worried about criminal liability have a Janus-faced
stake in knowledge. From one perspective, knowledge can be pow-
er and security.23 Regular audits of employee performance can help
corporations streamline operations, increase efficiencies, and boost
profitability.24 Audits also generate information critical for design-
ing and implementing programs to prevent employees—and hence
their corporate employers—from committing crimes and incurring
criminal liabilities.25 From another perspective, knowledge can
be a great vulnerability. The line between criminal and innocent
20. See Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail—and How to Fix
Them, 96 HARV. BUS. REV. 116, 118-19 (2018) (“Many executives are rightly frustrated about
paying immense and growing compliance costs without seeing clear benefits. And yet they
continue to invest—not because they think it’s necessarily productive but because they fear
exposing their organizations to greater liability should they fail to spend enough.... The DOJ
recognized that firms might be spending a lot and creating all the components of compliance
programs but actually producing hollow facades.”).
21. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 399.
22. See id. at 393-94.
23. See, e.g., Chen & Soltes, supra note 20, at 119 (explaining the potential benefits of
internal compliance programs that promote self-regulation and reporting).
24. Monitoring employees to improve productivity is becoming commonplace as
consultants develop monitoring tools. See Katie Johnston, Firms Step Up Employee
Monitoring at Work, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 18, 2016, 8:04 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
business/2016/02/18/firms-step-monitoring-employee-activities-work/2r5hoCjsEZWA0bp
10BzPrN/story.html [https://perma.cc/4DBN-Z5JQ] (“Sapience Analytics, a workforce data
firm in California and India, introduced a product last year that displays employees’ activities
in a window visible to workers as well as bosses. One client that used the product, an IT
services company with more than 5,000 employees, reported a 90-minute daily increase per
person in ‘core activities’—coding for a developer as opposed to answering e-mails—after being
made aware of their work patterns, said spokesman Khiv Singh.... The company reported a
$2 million annual profit increase.”); Tom Pfeiffer, Performance Audit, Monitoring & Evalua-
tion: Economy, Efficiency & Effectiveness, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/lu/en/pages/
audit/solutions/performance-audit.html [https://perma.cc/6972-KHDJ] (“The aim of a perfor-
mance audit is to provide recommendations about where and how improvement can be made
and to identify the likely impact they may have.”).
25. See, e.g., Bradley J. McAllister, The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Provisions on FCPA Enforcement and Modern Corporate Compliance Programs, 14 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 45, 49 (2017) (explaining that, by requiring “strong internal audit procedures and
enhanced internal investigation capabilities,” the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “encourage[s] a culture
of compliance” and aims to reduce criminal misconduct).
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conduct frequently turns on what defendants knew.26 As a result,
monitoring employees can sometimes make corporations worse off.27
The same internal corporate compliance and audit programs that
gather information that is crucial to help corporations prevent crime
can also produce knowledge that converts otherwise permissible
corporate conduct into crime.28
Whereas corporations have an ambivalent relationship with
knowledge, the criminal justice system’s interest in corporate
knowledge is one-sided: the more corporations know, the better off
the criminal justice system tends to be. Congress,29 prosecutors,30
and judges31 are all committed to reforming corporations and pro-
moting effective corporate compliance programs. A large part of
what this means is ensuring that corporations have adequate proce-
dures for generating and transmitting information through appro-
priate channels to personnel who can respond when problems are
uncovered.32 The more corporations know about themselves, the
26. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
27. See Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 321, 325 (2012) (“[T]he Organizational Guidelines do not provide firms with
sufficient mitigation to ensure that firms face lower expected sanctions if they undertake
effective corporate policing when corporate policing substantially increases the probability
that the government can detect and sanction the wrong.”).
28. See generally Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. REG. 1, 17-18
(2019) (explaining that successor liability disincentivizes the investigation and reporting of
misconduct).
29. See McAllister, supra note 25, at 45, 48-49 (discussing the compliance program
requirements that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 place on publicly traded companies).
30. The deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements that prose-
cutors sign with corporations suspected of criminal misconduct routinely require corporations
to undergo programs of reform. See Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow, Introduction to
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT
3 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) [hereinafter PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM] (using deferred prosecution agreements, “prosecutors impose affirmative ob-
ligations on companies to change personnel, revamp their business practices, and adopt new
models of corporate governance”).
31. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018)
(“Such compliance and ethics program shall be reasonably designed, implemented, and en-
forced so that the program is generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal
conduct.”). See generally Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory
of Corporate Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 559-62 (2018) (discussing the benefits of
judge-led reform).
32. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at C-3, United States v. HSBC Holdings PLC,
No. 18-CR-00030 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018) (requiring company to “enhance the compliance
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better able they are to anticipate and prevent misconduct. Should
something still go awry, as it inevitably will,33 corporate knowledge
is crucial to ensuring accountability. Prosecutors are in a better
position to bring charges against corporations that acted knowingly.
In light of the criminal justice system’s strong interests in corpo-
rate knowledge, and corporations’ mixed incentives to know things,
we might expect criminal law to have nuanced doctrines about cor-
porate knowledge. It does not.34 Most circuits35 simply apply the
centuries-old, mechanistic doctrine familiar from civil law36—
respondeat superior—and thereby treat corporate knowledge just
like any other corporate mental state.37 That doctrine allows pro-
secutors to attribute mens rea from employees to their corporate
employers but requires prosecutors to find one single employee with
all the knowledge needed for conviction.38 Whatever merits
respondeat superior has with respect to some mental states,39 it
reporting process ... [and] other reporting systems, through which employees report known
or suspected violations of the Company’s ... policies and U.S. laws and regulations, and that
includes a process designed to ensure that known or suspected violations are promptly
escalated to appropriate personnel for appropriate resolution and reporting”); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (“Spe-
cific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day operational respon-
sibility for the compliance and ethics program. Individual(s) with operational responsibility
shall report periodically to high-level personnel.”).
33. See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense
to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 644 (1995)
(observing that even through robust compliance programs, corporations cannot have complete
control over their employees).
34. See Diamantis, supra note 11, at 2050 (“[C]ourts have no real theory of how
corporations ... could instantiate [an actus reus or a mens rea].”).
35. See Thomas A. Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate Corporate
Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210, 227 (1997) (“[O]nly a few courts
addressing criminal or civil issues have alluded to the collective knowledge rule.” (footnotes
omitted)).
36. See, e.g., Phila. & Reading R.R. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 486-87 (1852).
37. See Diamantis, supra note 11, at 2050.
38. See Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 113 (“[W]here the case against a single actor within an organization
does not contain all of the requisite elements of the crime, respondeat superior liability would
not attach to the corporation.”); George R. Skupski, The Senior Management Mens Rea:
Another Stab at a Workable Integration of Organizational Culpability into Corporate Criminal
Liability, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 263, 282 (2011) (“[T]he traditional respondeat superior
theory requiring the prosecution to establish the requisite mental state in at least one in-
dividual agent.”).
39. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations,
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performs poorly when it comes to others—such as knowledge—that
can be dispersed over many people.40 Corporations can manipulate
such a mental state by partitioning it across employees so that
no one employee has it in its entirety. Today’s corporate behemoths,
characterized by complex operations that require a diffusion of re-
sponsibility and authority, do not even have to try to spread knowl-
edge thinly.41 If anything, they must fight the entropic dispersion of
information that is a natural product of large-scale operations.42
Despite these conflicting incentives, respondeat superior decidedly
pushes corporations away from allowing employees to acquire too
much knowledge. The more individual employees know, the more
likely it is that the corporation can be prosecuted when bad things
happen.
Some jurisdictions have supplemented respondeat superior with
the collective knowledge doctrine. This ham-handed approach frees
prosecutors from the need to find one employee with all of the cul-
pable knowledge by allowing them to aggregate the knowledge of all
corporate employees for attribution to the corporation.43 In so doing,
the collective knowledge doctrine flips corporate incentives concern-
ing knowledge on their head. If corporations are on the hook for
every scrap of information known by every employee, they must
have mechanisms to gather and process it all. While this may be a
win for prosecutors—because corporations are more likely to have
inculpating knowledge when they misbehave—these mechanisms
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1376 n.102 (2009) (“[R]espondeat superior in criminal cases seeks
to promote the efficient monitoring of employees by holding firms strictly (and jointly) liable
for the employees’ intentionally produced harms.”).
40. Another dispersible mental state is negligence. See, e.g., R. v. Her Majesty’s Coroner
for E. Kent, (1987) 88 Cr. App. R. 10 QB at 16 (Eng.) (acquitting corporate ferry operator of
manslaughter because the negligence that led one of its ships to capsize was spread thinly
across many employees). Scholars have criticized respondeat superior as it applies to
negligence, too. See, e.g., Albert Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
1422, 1433 (1966).
41. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Model Penal Code Conference Transcript—Discussion Two,
19 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 635 (1988) (“[I]t’s going to be impossible in many instances to find a
single culpable individual.”).
42. Despite expensive spending on information management technology, in 2002, Fortune
500 companies lost an estimated $31.5 billion due to failure to share knowledge. See Pamela
Babcock, Shedding Light on Knowledge Management, HR MAG. (May 1, 2004), https://www.
shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/Pages/0504covstory.aspx [https://perma.cc/F75J-XYMQ].
43. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
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come at a great cost. As one court put it, “[T]he imputation of every
bit of knowledge known to each individual employee—from the
Chief Executive Officer to the most recently hired recruit—would
likely paralyze a corporation.”44 The marginal social costs for cor-
porations to collect and process increasing quantities of information
must eventually exceed the marginal social benefits from crime
prevention.45 We may approach that point soon, if we have not
already in some industries, and social waste lies beyond it.46
The heart of the problem is the law’s failure to recognize and
grapple with the distinction between knowledge and information.
Under respondeat superior, corporations have a strong incentive to
turn knowledge into mere information dispersed through the corpo-
ration and to prevent dispersed information from becoming cen-
tralized knowledge.47 Under the collective knowledge doctrine,
corporations have strong incentives to implement inefficiently com-
plex compliance systems that convert all information into knowl-
edge by centralizing and processing it.48 On the doctrinal line
between knowledge and mere information rests the incentives
criminal law gives corporations to scale their audit and compliance
programs up or down. If the law draws the line under- or overinclu-
sively, it will under- or over-incentivize corporations to collect and
process information. Without a considered approach, criminal law
is missing an opportunity to fine-tune the incentives corporations
have to balance risk, compliance, and cost.49
More than incentive setting hangs in the balance. The criminal
justice system is also a system of justice. Corporations must face the
44. In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 870 F.
Supp. 1293, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 15 F.3d 1249 (3d Cir. 1994).
45. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 409.
46. See id. at 392.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 128-30.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 180-81.
49. Scholars are becoming increasingly attuned to the interconnections between corporate
law and corporate criminal law. See, e.g., William Robert Thomas, The Ability and Respon-
sibility of Corporate Law to Improve Criminal Fines, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 601, 601 (2017). 
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punishment they deserve, and the rule of law50 and due process51
demand that they do so on terms antecedently set in statute by
the legislature. To convict corporations justly of knowledge-based
crimes, courts must have an adequate theory of corporate knowl-
edge. Characterizing corporate knowledge too narrowly, as respon-
deat superior does, will fail to hold corporations accountable when
they engage in clear criminal wrongdoing.52 This is unfair to the
victims of that wrongdoing53 and risks undermining the broader
legitimacy of criminal law.54 Characterizing corporate knowledge
too broadly risks convicting corporations for something less than
knowledge, thereby unjustly burdening innocent shareholders,
employees, and creditors whose interests are bound up with those
of the corporation.55 If we are to realize the intent behind legislators’
efforts to pair crimes with just punishments,56 the law needs a
normatively defensible corporate epistemology.
This Article offers that. Respondeat superior and the collec-
tive knowledge doctrine apply with equal force and in the same
way to all corporations and all types of knowledge.57 Given the huge
50. See Overview—Rule of Law, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-
resources/educational-activities/overview-rule-law [https://perma.cc/K33N-ZSAE] (“Rule of law
is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities are accountable to laws that
are: [p]ublicly promulgated[,] [e]qually enforced[,] [i]ndependently adjudicated[,] [a]nd
consistent with international human rights principles.”).
51. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding that due process “requires
that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”).
52. See Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive
Criminal Liability, 49 BUS. LAW. 617, 625 (1994) (“Given the often complex and decentralized
nature of many corporations, it is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, to prove that any
single corporate agent acted with the necessary intent and knowledge to commit an offense.”).
53. See Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 833, 843 (2000) (“Criminal liability in turn expresses the community’s
condemnation of the wrongdoer’s conduct by emphasizing the standards for appropriate
behavior—that is, the standards by which persons and goods properly should be valued.”).
54. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT
(2013) (discussing the importance of “core” agreement in regards to punishment).
55. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 1367 (“This punishment is inflicted instead on human
beings whose guilt remains unproven. Innocent shareholders pay the fines, and innocent
employees, creditors, customers, and communities sometimes feel the pinch too.”).
56. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (stating
that the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act include “providing certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing”).
57. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 33, at 619-20; infra notes 180-82 and accompanying
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variation in size, complexity, and industry among corporations, it
should come as no surprise that such a one-size-fits-all approach
falls short. In place of present doctrine, this Article proposes a
“functional approach” that uses two scalable variables to draw the
line between what counts as information and what counts as
knowledge. The first variable is the cost of acquiring the knowledge,
i.e., how much it would cost to implement and maintain a compli-
ance program that gathers and processes the information into a
usable form. In the terminology of this Article, this is a measure of
how “effortful” it would be for the corporation to acquire the
knowledge. The second variable is the “obviousness” of the knowl-
edge, i.e., whether peer corporations (of similar size, industry, etc.)
gather and process similar information in similar circumstances. In
the present proposal, these two factors push the line dividing
knowledge and mere information in opposite directions. The less
effort a corporation would need to process some information and the
more obvious that information is, the more likely a court should
treat that information as something the corporation knows.
Conversely, the more effort required and the less obvious some
information is, the less likely a court should treat the information
as knowledge. This Article argues that such a scaling, functional
approach to corporate knowledge could efficiently calibrate corpo-
rate compliance incentives by striking the right balance between the
costs of corporate crime and compliance. Importantly, it would stay
truer than current doctrine to Congress’s choice to define some
crime in terms of culpable knowledge.
Along the way, this Article gives much-needed attention to some
unacknowledged nuances of the collective knowledge doctrine.
Courts’ and scholars’ reception of the collective knowledge doctrine
has been mixed.58 Indeed, only one court has unambiguously en-
dorsed the collective knowledge doctrine after it was introduced to
corporate criminal law more than three decades ago.59 Many worry
text.
58. See Eli Lederman, Corporate Criminal Liability: The Second Generation, 46 STETSON
L. REV. 71, 82-83 (2016) (“The approach of federal and state courts toward [collective knowl-
edge] varies.”). Compare Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 241 (5th Cir. 2010)
(rejecting the collective knowledge doctrine), with United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 894 (D.D.C. 2006).
59. See Steve Solow, What Does a Corporation Have to “Know” to Be Criminally
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that the doctrine overreaches and makes corporations too vulner-
able to prosecution.60 This worry is justified, but fixable. Many
scholars and courts—because they often conflate knowledge and
information—have overlooked an important difference between how
the doctrine is formulated and how it is applied. In the space be-
tween formulation and application, courts are making normative
choices sub silentio about the difference between knowledge and
information. For committed opponents of the collective knowledge
doctrine, this observation may reaffirm their opinion of its deficits.
For people who think (as argued below) that the law needs some-
thing like collective knowledge to patch the doctrinal gaps left by
respondeat superior, there is space to refine collective knowledge
and address its potential overreach.
This Article begins with some background to corporate knowl-
edge, in Part I, and a general critique of present doctrine for attrib-
uting knowledge to corporations, in Part II. To carry the analysis
forward, Part III details an evaluative framework for better under-
standing the shortcomings of present doctrine and the advantages
of the coming proposal. It suggests that a successful approach would
do two things: (1) give corporations efficient incentives to implement
and maintain socially optimal levels of compliance, and (2) stay true
to Congress’s choice to use knowledge as an element of certain
crimes. Part IV introduces the notions of effort and obviousness to
develop a functional approach to corporate knowledge. As this Ar-
ticle shows in Part V, this functional approach can give corporations
the right incentives and makes intuitive sense of what “knowledge”
means in criminal statutes as applied to corporations. This Article
concludes with some reflections on the broader implications and
uses of the functional approach, that is for civil law and corporate
advocacy.
Prosecuted?, COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 5, 2016), https://wp.nyu.edu/ compliance_
enforcement/2016/10/05/what-does-a-corporation-have-to-know-to-be-criminally-prosecuted/
[https://perma.cc/952V-V5GC].
60. See Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 35, at 239 (“[C]ollective knowledge doctrine
would result in a criminal conviction for simple negligence, and not intentional wrongdoing.
That is presumably not what Congress contemplates when it uses the word knowingly in a
statute.”); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1338 n.38 (2009) (“[T]he collective knowledge
doctrine is probably more vulnerable to objections than the New York Central standard.”).
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A short methodological note: this Article primarily targets
judges, who created and have the power to refine the doctrines dis-
cussed below.61 This Article aims to work within the parameters of
established corporate criminal law and to propose doctrines that will
supplement, rather than replace.62 It will not question, because the
law does not, whether it ultimately makes sense to hold corpora-
tions criminally liable or whether corporations can have culpable
mens rea like knowledge.63 Politically, corporate criminal law is very
popular in the United States64 and is expanding both here65 and
abroad.66 For better or worse, it is here to stay.67 This Article takes
this fact as its starting point. It tries to make the best sense of cor-
porate criminal law as it stands, so that the law can achieve its own
goals and advance many of the less controversial goals of corporate
civil and administrative law. To the extent possible, this Article will
take present legal doctrines that bear on corporate knowledge as it
finds them. The goal is to fill in the gaps in a way that can fulfill the
law’s policy and justice objectives. This approach has the significant
advantage of a realistic prospect for implementation. The judges
who are its intended audience prefer incremental change.68
61. See Stacey Neumann Vu, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the
Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 486 (2004) (“With the exception
of the [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines], the body of law that defines the contours of corporate
criminal liability is entirely judge made and thus subject to evolution and refinement.”
(footnote omitted)).
62. Corporate criminal law has no shortage of vocal critics calling for its abolition. See,
e.g., Hasnas, supra note 60, at 1329 (“[Corporate criminal liability] should be explicitly
overruled.”).
63. As I have argued elsewhere, I think corporate criminal law is a valuable institution
and the concept of corporate culpability makes sense. See Diamantis, supra note 11, at 2058-
67.
64. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 612 (2012) (“The
public has increasingly registered greater moral outrage in response to corporate governance
scandals.”).
65. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1477 (1996) (noting the expansion of corporate criminal liability).
66. See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the
Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126,
142 (2008) (“Germany continues to resist corporate criminal liability, even as many of her
neighbors in Western Europe have tentatively begun to change course in response to recent
corporate scandals in the United States and Europe.”).
67. See William Robert Thomas, How and Why Corporations Became (and Remain)
Persons Under the Criminal Law, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479, 481 (2018).
68. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4 (1985); Boris I.
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I. BACKGROUND TO KNOWLEDGE, CORPORATE AND CRIMINAL69
Corporate knowledge, like any corporate mental state, is an odd
sort of thing.70 The law often speaks as though corporations have
mental states.71 Furthermore, as I discuss below, we all have in-
grained psychological mechanisms that dispose us to think of cor-
porations as capable of knowing, intending, and feeling things.72
Even so, it strains credulity to think that corporations really have
minds.73 Judges sometimes step out of role and recognize this
tension between law and common sense by acknowledging that the
corporate mind is fiction.74 The tension is never dissolved. As the
Supreme Court has affirmed, “[T]he corporate personality is a fic-
tion, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were
a fact.”75
With respect specifically to knowledge, one thing that compounds
the confusion is that criminal law, both for corporate and natural
person defendants, understands knowledge in a very idiosyncratic
way. Epistemologists, academics who study knowledge, would uni-
versally reject the criminal law’s definition.76 Though there are still
Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What
Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 51 (1995) (“Judges are cautious and reflective, if not by na-
ture, then by nurture: legal education is respectful of precedent and favors incremental
changes over convulsions.”).
69. I am grateful to Eric Miller and Chad Flanders for encouraging me to add this impor-
tant clarifying Part.
70. See generally Diamantis, supra note 11 (describing the legal peculiarities and other
issues with the corporate knowledge doctrine).
71. See Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational “Real
Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 581 (1989).
72. See infra Part III.B.
73. See David H. Kistenbroker et al., Corporate Motive and Time Warner: Smoke and
Mirrors Revisited, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, NO. B-1386 125, 129 (2003) (“Corporations may legally be people, but they
are also legal fictions and only natural persons can possess states of mind.”).
74. See Cruz v. Homebase, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435, 439 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Corporations are
legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure
or deceive.”); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 772 (2019) (“A corporation has no mind.”).
75. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
76. See PAUL K. MOSER & ARNOLD VANDER NAT, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 12-15 (1987) (describing the justification condition of knowledge
and explaining that “knowledge is not simply true belief”).
2019] FUNCTIONAL CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE 335
many open debates about particulars,77 epistemologists largely
agree that knowledge is something like “justified true belief.”78 The
qualification that the belief be justified is meant to exclude cases
where someone has a random belief that just happens to be true but
has no good reason for believing it. For example, someone’s horo-
scope might predict that “a lot of information will be coming at
[them] rapidly today.”79 She might believe it, and it might come true.
However, it would be odd to say she knew it would happen. She may
have been confident, but she lacked any good justification for her
belief (apologies to the astrologists out there). Criminal law’s
definition of “knowledge” nixes the justification requirement.80
Knowledge in criminal law is just any true belief.81 The Model Penal
Code, for example, defines knowledge in terms of “practical[ ]
certain[ty]” and “aware[ness] of a high probability.”82 There is no
mention of justification.83
This may be because criminal law does not really care about
knowledge in the precise philosophical sense of the term. The
function that knowledge and the other mens rea play in the criminal
law is to distinguish merely harmful behavior from criminal be-
havior.84 Thought alone is not punishable.85 And punishing acts
without requiring any accompanying mental state, though some
statutes allow it, is a disfavored exception to the general rule.86
Mens rea elements also serve to grade how serious an offense is.
Intentional harms are more serious than knowing harms, which in
77. See Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121, 121
(1963) (arguing that not all justified true belief is knowledge).
78. See MOSER & VANDER NAT, supra note 76, at 3.
79. Aries Daily Horoscope, ZODIACMORE, https://zodiacmore.com/daily-horoscope/ [https://
perma.cc/WL3L-EJZK].
80. See Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17
(1927) (“Describing knowledge as belief in the existence of a fact, belief is the mental element
which if coincident with truth creates knowledge.”).
81. See id.
82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
83. See id.
84. See Winnie Chan & A.P. Simester, Four Functions of Mens Rea, 70 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
381, 381 (2011).
85. See Gabriel S. Mendlow, Why Is It Wrong to Punish Thought?, 127 YALE L.J. 2342,
2345 (2018).
86. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 35 (2019) (“Strict criminal liability statutes remain the
exception in our criminal law system, not the rule, and have a generally disfavored status.”
(footnote omitted)).
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turn are more serious than harms caused negligently.87 So arguably,
what criminal law really cares about when it uses knowledge as a
mens rea element is not knowledge per se. Rather, criminal law
cares about internal states of people—corporate and natural—who
do bad things, and whether those internal states make the people
as culpable as if they had done the bad thing knowingly, in the
philosophical sense.
Internal states that are as culpable as knowledge play the same
role as actual knowledge, so far as the criminal law is concerned.88
This explains why criminal law has doctrines for so-called “con-
structive knowledge,” such as willful blindness.89 Willful blindness
refers to situations where a person is aware of a high probability
that a fact is true and deliberately avoids confirming it.90 In such
cases, courts will impute knowledge of the fact to the defendant,
even though she does not know it in the epistemological sense.91 The
thought here is that “[d]eliberate ignorance and positive knowledge
are [equivalent in the sense of being] equally culpable.”92 Both are
types of knowledge, so far as the criminal law is concerned.93
The criminal law’s flexible conception of knowledge gives some
theoretical wiggle room for framing this Article. Is the law’s con-
ception focused on corporate knowledge in the epistemological sense
or on corporate states that are the criminal justice equivalent of
knowledge, i.e. constructive knowledge? In a sense, the answer does
not matter. So far as the criminal law is concerned, both knowledge
87. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 689-90 (1983) (discussing
how mens rea is used to grade the seriousness of criminal conduct).
88. See Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “knowledge” as “a
state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact” and
“actual knowledge” as “direct and clear knowledge”).
89. See id.
90. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011) (“While the Courts
of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to
agree on two basic requirements: (1) The defendant must subjectively believe that there is a
high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid
learning of that fact. We think these requirements give willful blindness an appropriately
limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence.” (footnote omitted)).
91. See id. at 769 n.9.
92. Sean Bajkowski & Kimberly R. Thompson, Corporate Criminal Liability, 34 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 445, 452 (1997).
93. See id.
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in the epistemic sense and constructive knowledge are species of
what it calls “knowledge.”94 For readers who care most about
knowledge in the epistemic sense and think groups like corporations
can have it, the functional account I offer below is the most intuitive
approach available.95 For readers who think corporations cannot
have knowledge in the epistemic sense, all doctrines of corporate
knowledge are necessarily doctrines of constructive knowledge be-
cause corporations never know anything in the epistemic sense.96
These readers may view this Article as continuing in that tradi-
tion, but trying to offer a superior, more flexible account of when
criminal corporations have internal states that are the criminal
justice equivalents of knowledge.
II. CURRENT DOCTRINES FOR CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE
Criminal law currently has two doctrines for attributing knowl-
edge to corporations: respondeat superior97 and the collective
knowledge doctrine.98 As much as possible, I aim to leave these
doctrines in place. But they cannot stand totally undisturbed if we
are to have an efficient and just corporate criminal law. Judges
introduced both doctrines in response to real gaps in corporate
liability.99 Unfortunately, they did so with little attention to sound
policy or conceptual coherence.100 As discussed below, both doctrines
were adopted from civil law without acknowledging the important
differences of the criminal law context.101 As practical solutions, they
are impractical. As criminal justice solutions, they are unjust.
The doctrines fail for opposite reasons. Respondeat superior
characterizes corporate knowledge too narrowly. It allows corpora-
tions to escape liability by leaving a lot of information on the table
94. See David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 959 (1999) (explaining that
in criminal law, willful ignorance and knowledge are equivalent).
95. See infra Part IV.D.
96. See Simon Stern, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and Administrative
Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2007) (discussing collective knowledge
as a type of constructive knowledge).
97. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909).
98. See United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
99. See N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 494-95; Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 856.
100. See N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 494-95; Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 856.
101. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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as mere information.102 This under-incentivizes investment in cor-
porate compliance and allows corporations to escape retributive
punishment.103 The collective knowledge doctrine moves too far in
the opposite direction, characterizing too much information as
knowledge.104 Consequently, it incentivizes corporations to invest in
socially wasteful compliance and unjustly subjects corporations to
knowledge-level sanctions where mere negligence is at issue.105
A. Respondeat Superior
Crimes typically require an actus reus and a mens rea,106 but
corporations have neither bodies with which to act nor minds with
which to think.107 Everything they do or think, they do or think
through their employees. Criminal law courts needed some doctrine
for determining when to attribute the acts and mental states of
employees to their corporate employers.108 So they borrowed the
doctrine of respondeat superior from tort law.109 After some re-
finement over the years, the doctrine currently directs courts to at-
tribute to corporations any act or mental state exhibited by any
single employee “within the scope of [her] employment [and] with
the intent to benefit the corporation.”110 Thus, if the government
102. See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 38, at 85-86 (explaining that respondeat superior
may fail to hold corporations liable “when the act and the intent do not coincide in a single
corporate actor”).
103. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 33, at 664, 682 (explaining that the existence of a
compliance program is usually not a defense to respondeat superior and that sometimes a cost
versus benefit analysis weighs against maintaining a robust compliance program).
104. See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 38, at 120.
105. See Ashley S. Kircher, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability Versus Corporate Securities
Fraud Liability: Analyzing the Divergence in Standards of Culpability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
157, 167 (2009) (discussing how critics of collective knowledge argue it leads to excessive
monitoring compliance).
106. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (“In the criminal law, both
a culpable mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur.”).
107. See, e.g., Kistenbroker et al., supra note 73, at 130 (“Corporations may legally be peo-
ple, but they are also legal fictions and only natural persons can possess states of mind.”).
108. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 33, at 614-17.
109. See id.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An employer is subject
to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employ-
ment.”); see Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanction, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (1979) [hereinafter Developments
in the Law—Corporate Crime]. This Article does not claim that this jurisprudence has settled
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can demonstrate that some employee knew something, and the
scope and intent requirements are met, a court must conclude that
the corporation knew it too.111
Respondeat superior is, in a sense, quite permissive; corporations,
regardless of size and geographic reach, are potentially on the hook
for any criminal act or culpable mental state of any employee.112 The
doctrine has become even more permissive as courts have weakened
its two limitations.113 For example, many observers thought that
employees who totally disregarded explicit instructions from their
employers were not working “within the scope of [their] employ-
ment.”114 Courts later held that was no bar to corporate liability
under respondeat superior.115 Many also thought that “inten[t] to
benefit” meant prosecutors would have to show that an employee
actually intended to benefit her employer.116 Again, courts inter-
preted respondeat superior broadly so that now even some subsid-
iary, hypothetical intent an employee could have had to benefit her
employer might satisfy the “intent to benefit” requirement.117
Though backed by more than a hundred years of criminal
jurisprudence, respondeat superior is not popular among com-
mentators.118 In earlier work, I provided an account of respondeat
superior’s mixed history and increasing ineptitude as a general doc-
trine of liability for modern corporations.119 I turn here to its fail-
ings specifically as a doctrine for attributing knowledge. The aging
on the optimal conception of corporate action, and readers should feel free to substitute their
own.
111. See Developments in Law—Corporate Crime, supra note 110, at 1247.
112. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 33, at 619-20.
113. See Developments in Law—Corporate Crime, supra note 110, at 1247-50.
114. Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2, 8 (6th Cir. 1946) (“[T]here is ir-
reconcilable conflict among the authorities as to whether a principal may be held criminally
liable for the acts of his agent, acting within the scope of his apparent authority but against
the positive instructions of his principal.”).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972).
116. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 33, at 623 (“So long as the agent’s acts were motivated
in part by some desire to benefit the corporation, they may be imputed to the corporation
itself.”). 
117. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
118. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 520 (2006) (“[A]lmost no one has defended respondeat superior as the right liability
rule.”). 
119. See Diamantis, supra note 11, at 2053-58.
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doctrine fails to take account of modern corporations’ malleability,
which allows corporations to avoid justice by structuring what
becomes knowledge and what remains mere information.120
Ironically, in light of its permissiveness, the basic trouble with
respondeat superior is that it defines corporate knowledge too nar-
rowly. In so doing, it allows corporations to leave as mere informa-
tion, or to convert to mere information, what it would benefit
criminal justice for them to know.121 All corporations want to
manage their criminal liabilities. In order to be convicted of a
knowledge-based crime under respondeat superior, prosecutors have
to find a single employee with all of the predicate knowledge.122 But
corporations can be large organizations, with responsibility for
different operations and suboperations dispersed across thousands
of employees.123 The beauty of the assembly line, and the source of
its efficiency, is that nobody working on it needs to know how to
build a car; they only need to know how to screw the bolts or weld
the joints for which they are responsible.124 Unlike assembly lines,
large corporations typically have no equivalent of a foreman or lead
engineer who knows the entire operation inside and out.125 The
natural congregation point for corporate knowledge, the executive
suite, often has the least detailed knowledge about corporate
operations.126 The higher one travels up the corporate pyramid, the
120. See id. at 2056-57.
121. David Luban has a nice, related discussion of how this plays out for individuals. See
Luban, supra note 94, at 976-77.
122. See Nan S. Ellis & Steven B. Dow, Attaching Criminal Liability to Credit Rating
Agencies: Use of the Corporate Ethos Theory of Criminal Liability, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167,
180 (2014) (“In order to attach liability under respondeat superior, corporations are held lia-
ble only if a specific guilty individual can be identified.”).
123. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972)
(recognizing that corporations are “[c]omplex business structures, characterized by [the]
decentralization and delegation of authority”); Kircher, supra note 105, at 159. (“[T]he
respondeat superior approach is highly problematic because the corporate structure can make
it difficult to locate and establish the guilt of agents who possess the requisite intent and,
thus, the corporate defendant has the advantage of being able to create reasonable doubt as
to each agent and to escape liability altogether.”).
124. See Assembly Line, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
technology/assembly-line [https://perma.cc/A2TR-WTEW].
125. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 33, at 635 (“Corporations are highly decentralized,
with responsibilities delegated down several levels of management.”).
126. See Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime, supra note 110, at 1254-55 (“[T]op
officials whose conduct would subject the corporation to liability [under the Model Penal Code
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more ignorance one finds about the day-to-day operations where
criminal conduct is most likely to occur.127 Under respondeat
superior, prosecutors routinely have trouble pursuing large corpo-
rations for knowledge-based crimes because the corporate informa-
tion structure often prevents anyone from having the requisite
knowledge.128
Respondeat superior gives corporations a strong incentive to leave
compliance-relevant information dispersed, unaggregated, and un-
processed.129 Doing so increases the chance that no single employee
will know enough to satisfy the mens rea requirement of knowledge-
based crimes.130 As such, respondeat superior tends to push corpo-
rate incentives concerning knowledge in just one direction—toward
ignorance and against investment in compliance.
Corporations can and do exploit this knowledge loophole of re-
spondeat superior in ways that immunize them from criminal
charges.131 By structuring operations and employee roles, they can
assure that lower-level employees are unlikely to acquire enough
relevant knowledge.132 Corporate structures can hinder the hori-
zontal flow of information between individuals and operations at
proposal] are often too far removed from daily operations to be charged with authorizing or
recklessly tolerating criminal activity at lower levels.”); Brickey, supra note 41, at 643
(explaining that strict liability rules may be necessary because management is removed from
on the ground operators).
127. See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD AND ABUSE 40 (2014), http://www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/274K-GBDQ] (showing that approximately 80 percent of fraud within cor-
porations is committed by nonexecutives).
128. See Michael L. Benson et al., District Attorneys and Corporate Crime: Surveying the
Prosecutorial Gatekeepers, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 505, 511-12 (1988) (reporting from a survey of
district attorneys in California that the difficulty of pinpointing individual intent discourages
them from filing charges against corporations).
129. See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 38, at 85-86 (explaining that respondeat superior
may fail to hold corporations liable “when the act and the intent do not coincide in a single
corporate actor”).
130. See id. “Given that many corporations are large decentralized groups of individuals,
often with collectivized decisionmaking structures and a multitude of actors participating in
a single corporate act,” respondeat superior is not always an effective way of holding corpo-
rations accountable. Id.
131. See Benson et al., supra note 128, at 507 (describing how prosecutorial efforts can be
thwarted because “large-scale organizations develop mechanisms for shielding their members
from responsibility for corporate actions”).
132. See ALEXANDER SARCH, CRIMINALLY IGNORANT: WHY THE LAW PRETENDS WE KNOW
WHAT WE DON’T 231, 252 (2019); Benson et al., supra note 128, at 511-12.
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the same level simply because, for example, employees are placed in
geographically distant offices or have different access to corporate
databases.133 Corporate structures can also inhibit the vertical flow
of information up the corporate hierarchy.134 Well-trained middle
managers know what their superiors want to know, and, just as
importantly, what they do not want to know.135
Respondeat superior also lacks the sort of flexibility it would need
to fine-tune incentives across a diversity of corporations. The doc-
trine applies the same unflinching conditions in every context.136
This is strange from an incentive-setting perspective. The public
and private costs of corporate knowledge and ignorance can vary
dramatically by industry. In some industries, such as those that
involve toxins or pollutants, the public costs of criminal conduct can
be very high, while the private costs of a corporation acquiring
enough knowledge to prevent the criminal conduct can be quite
low.137 In other industries, the public and private costs may be
reversed.138 These same costs also vary with a corporation’s
size—lower private costs of compliance and lower public costs of
crime for smaller corporations, reversed for large corporations.139
133. See Paul Graf, A Realistic Approach to Officer Liability, 66 BUS. LAW. 315, 322 (2011)
(questioning the assumption “that officers have unfettered access to information, apparently
because of their status as officers” and discussing the “insidious effects of corporate ‘silos’’’). 
134. See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate
Crime Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 546 (2004) (“Firms with information control
are likely sometimes to be able to ‘push liability downward’ to mid-level employees who re-
sponded to corporate incentives rather than acted as pure renegades.”).
135. See Luban, supra note 94, at 958 (“In the familiar corporate adage, bad news doesn’t
flow upstream.... ‘When the subordinate makes his report, he is often told: “I think you can
do better than that,” until the subordinate has worked out all the details of the boss’s
predetermined solution, without the boss being specifically aware of “all the eggs that have
to be broken.” ’” (quoting ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE
MANAGERS 20 (1988))).
136. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 33, at 619-20.
137. See Neal Shover & Aaron S. Routhe, Environmental Crime, 32 CRIME & JUST. 321, 329
(2005) (“The costs of environmental crime are numerous and varied, and no one seriously
disputes that its aggregate financial toll is enormous.”); see also id. at 345 (explaining
business response to the environmental movement).
138. See Hayne E. Leland, Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?, 100 J. POL. ECON.
859, 883-85 (1992) (arguing that insider trading may be beneficial in reducing uncertainty in
the markets). 
139. See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 271, 296 (2008) (“An organization’s size and structure undoubtedly affect its ability to
eliminate agent misconduct. When a firm has numerous agents, it becomes likely that some
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This means that the socially optimal level of investment in knowl-
edge-generating compliance mechanisms varies among corporations,
as does the sort of inducement that would get corporations to invest
at that level.
Respondeat superior also fails to provide a retributively satisfying
account of corporate knowledge. By diffusing information across
multiple employees, corporations can escape justice despite the
palpable sense that they knowingly did something wrong.140 For
example, suppose a natural gas pipeline explodes, killing several
people, because corporate employees did not operate the pipeline
following minimum safety standards.141 Federal law criminalizes
knowing violations of these standards.142 But if the knowledge
relevant to the violation was spread across different employees—
those in the back offices who knew about the standards and those
in the field who knew how the pipeline was being operated—the
corporation may escape prosecution.143 Under respondeat superior,
the corporation would not have committed a crime since no one
person within the corporation would have known the standards
were being shirked.144
To make matters worse, it does not matter under respondeat
superior why there was no communication channel between the le-
gal and the operational employees.145 There are any number of
conceivable innocent explanations, but there are also more nefarious
possibilities that seem tantamount to corporate knowledge.146
Respondeat superior would require acquittal of knowledge-based
charges whatever the explanation.147 Perhaps the information flow
was inhibited by a technological problem that no one knew or could
have known about. Perhaps the need for a communication channel
was apparent, but executives in the company thought it was too
agents will commit misconduct notwithstanding the firm’s policing effort.”). 
140. For a fascinating discussion of several such cases, see SARCH, supra note 132, at 231-
34.
141. This discussion is based on United States v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 14-CR-00175-
TEH, 2015 WL 9460313, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015).
142. Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60123 (2012); 49 C.F.R. § 192.1 (2007).
143. See id. § 60123.
144. See Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime, supra note 110, at 1247.
145. See Ellis & Dow, supra note 122, at 180.
146. See Luban, supra note 94, at 970.
147. See Ellis & Dow, supra note 122, at 180.
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expensive. Or perhaps the legal and operational departments once
had open communication channels, but an executive concerned with
managing criminal liabilities interfered.148 In this last circumstance,
the relevant corporate mental state seems morally equivalent to
knowledge,149 a kind of corporate willful ignorance.150 But because
respondeat superior carves up corporate mental states at the indi-
vidual level, traditional willful ignorance doctrines that would
otherwise allow for knowledge attribution in federal law would not
apply.151 The executive in the last scenario would have had to will
her own ignorance, not that of another employee.152
B. The Collective Knowledge Doctrine
To plug the obvious gap that respondeat superior leaves in cor-
porate criminal liability for knowledge-based crimes, some juris-
dictions have adopted the collective knowledge doctrine.153 Under
the collective knowledge doctrine, prosecutors do not need to find a
single employee with all the relevant knowledge; they can attri-
bute to a corporation anything known by any and all of its employ-
ees.154 Continuing the exploding pipeline example from the last
Section, if one employee knows about applicable pipeline safety
148. Some might argue the doctrine of willful blindness could come into play here to estab-
lish the corporation’s knowledge. See Solow, supra note 59. Willful ignorance is a doctrine that
allows courts to attribute knowledge to a defendant who deliberately took steps to avoid
learning it. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 767 (2011) (accepting
the Model Penal Code’s definition of “ ‘knowledge of the existence of a particular fact’ to
include a situation in which ‘a person is aware of a high probability of [the fact’s] existence,
unless he actually believes that it does not exist’” (alteration in original) (quoting MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962))). Here, it is unlikely that willful igno-
rance would apply since the executive was not trying to avoid acquiring knowledge for herself,
but to prevent others from acquiring it. See id.
149. See Bajkowski & Thompson, supra note 92, at 452; Luban, supra note 94, at 970 (“The
idea is that when ignorance is self-imposed, the plea of ignorance is, to use the Latin word,
nothing but chutzpah.”).
150. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1137 (1991) (“Factfinders should ascertain whether channels
of communication are open and effective. If not, is the ineffectiveness accidental or planned?”);
Solow, supra note 59.
151. See Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 769.
152. See SARCH, supra note 132, at 232-33.
153. See United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
154. See id.
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standards and another knows how the pipeline is being operated,
under the collective knowledge doctrine, the corporation knows
both.155 So corporations can be guilty of knowledge-based crimes in
jurisdictions that accept the collective knowledge doctrine even
when there is no single employee with all the guilty knowledge.156
United States v. Bank of New England, the seminal case for the
collective knowledge doctrine,157 offers a good illustration of how this
works.158 The court was concerned to address situations where
“[c]orporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the ele-
ments of specific duties and operations into smaller components.”159
The defendant bank was charged with knowingly violating the
Currency Transaction Reporting Act160 by failing to report cash
transfers in excess of $10,000.161 Individual tellers had separately
cashed checks to the same customer that, when summed, totaled
more than $10,000.162 Another employee of the bank knew about the
reporting requirements, but not about the transactions.163 All of the
employees were acquitted because none knew both the legal limits
and that the transactions exceeded the limits.164 Under respondeat
superior, this would have required acquittal of the bank too;165
however, the court upheld the bank’s conviction using collective
knowledge.166
155. See id. at 855 (“[I]f Employee A knows one facet of [a legal] reporting requirement, B
knows another facet of it, and C a third facet of it, the bank knows them all.” (quoting and
approving jury instructions given at trial)). 
156. See id.
157. But see Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 35, at 227 (arguing that academics have
misinterpreted Bank of New England and its progeny as endorsing the collective knowledge
doctrine).
158. See 821 F.2d at 854-57.
159. Id. at 856.
160. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).
161. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 846-47.
162. Id. at 848.
163. Id. at 856-57.
164. Id. at 847.
165. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
166. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 856 (“It is irrelevant whether employees administering
one component of an operation know the specific activities of employees administering
another aspect of the operation.” (citing United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp.730,
738 (W.D. Va. 1974))); see T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. at 738 (“[A] corporation cannot
plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several employees was not
acquired by any one individual employee who then would have comprehended its full import.
Rather, the corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its
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Courts need something such as the collective knowledge doctrine
to address the shortcomings of respondeat superior. However, most
circuits are unfriendly to the doctrine, and few, if any, scholars
accept it without qualification.167 The central concern seems to be
that the doctrine treats knowledge as a species of negligence, hold-
ing corporations liable not for their knowledge, but for failing to
maintain open channels of communication between employees.168 As
two scholars put it, “[T]he end result is that Bank of New England
allows corporations to be prosecuted for criminal acts committed
negligently or recklessly by its employees.”169
Courts and scholars are right to be skeptical of collective knowl-
edge. However, because they have overlooked the doctrine’s infor-
mational logic, they have yet to fully appreciate why. The problem
is not simply that the doctrine allows courts to piece together items
of knowledge from distant employees. The problem is that knowl-
edge can be pieced together in different ways, and not all ways
contribute equally to the goals of corporate criminal justice. Only
once we recognize and distinguish the options can we have a chance
of shoring up collective knowledge to capture its benefits without its
excesses.
The range of possibilities for combining items of knowledge is
exhibited in a subtle difference between how courts formulate the
collective knowledge doctrine and how they apply it. As formulated,
the collective knowledge doctrine only allows courts to aggregate
knowledge for attribution to corporations.170 Mere aggregation
should do little to expand the scope of corporate liability. Under the
collective knowledge doctrine, if some employee knows A, another
knows B, and a third knows C, then their corporate employer knows
A, B, C, and nothing further.171 To be more concrete, consider an
adapted version of Bank of New England. Suppose that a bank teller
employees and is held responsible for their failure to act accordingly.”).
167. See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 64 (2007) (“The
collective knowledge doctrine has also received significant attention in the literature, much
of it negative.”).
168. See Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 35, at 239.
169. Martin J. Weinstein & Patricia Bennett Ball, Criminal Law’s Greatest Mystery
Thriller: Corporate Guilt Through Collective Knowledge, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 65, 82 (1994).
170. See Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 855-56.
171. See id. at 856.
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at one branch knows (A) that a customer withdrew $5500 from him.
Suppose that another bank teller at a different branch of the same
bank knows (B) that a customer, who happens to be the same
customer, withdrew $5500 from her. And finally, suppose that a
third bank employee knows (C) that any cash transactions totaling
over $10,000 must be reported to the federal government. If none of
the employees knows what the others know, can we conclude using
the collective knowledge doctrine that the bank knows it must file
a report?
The answer is clearly negative if we adhere strictly to the state-
ment of the doctrine. To be liable under the Currency Transaction
Reporting Act, the bank would have to know that some customer’s
transactions exceeded the reporting threshold.172 Clearly, no em-
ployee knows that. So, respondeat superior by itself would not
establish that the bank had the relevant knowledge.173 But the
collective knowledge doctrine cannot get the bank there either. A
chain of reasoning from aggregate knowledge to the relevant fact is
necessary. It is like the example with which the Article began:
someone may know how much money she has been given on three
separate occasions, but not yet know how much she has in total.
From knowing A, and knowing B, and knowing C, the bank could,
with some elementary logic, come to know the conjunction of them
all, “A and B and C.” With some mathematical reasoning, the bank
could then add $5500 to $5500 and check to see whether the result
is greater than $10,000. That the bank had a reporting obligation
may follow inferentially from the three things the employees knew,
but it is a distinct item of knowledge.
Nonetheless, the Bank of New England Court determined that
the purposes of corporate criminal law called for holding the bank
liable and affirmed the bank’s conviction.174 In doing so, the court
surreptitiously (or, more likely, unwittingly) applied a much more
permissive version of the collective knowledge doctrine than the
one it had stated.175 The court aggregated the knowledge of the
employees and then attributed all that knowledge and all relevant
172. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).
173. See supra text accompanying note 122.
174. 821 F.2d at 857.
175. See id. at 856.
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inferences from it to the bank.176 Applying this permissive version of
the collective knowledge doctrine, the court concluded that the bank
knew that it was required to file a report.177
The permissive collective knowledge doctrine makes some intu-
itive sense. We do frequently think knowing some proposition
entails knowing some propositions inferable from it. If someone
knows she is holding a square, we assume she knows that what she
is holding is not a circle. If someone knows she has a work call at
1 p.m. and a dentist appointment at 1 p.m., we assume she knows
she has a conflict. But without some limiting principle, unchecked
attribution of inferences runs afoul of a familiar philosophical
problem—it treats people as though they are logically omniscient.178
This is clearly a standard that no person, corporate or natural, can
achieve.179
Like respondeat superior, the collective knowledge doctrine, as
applied, lacks the necessary nuance to influence corporate incen-
tives properly. It pushes corporations in just one direction—towards
more investment in compliance. Since the doctrine effectively holds
corporations liable for everything known by any employee and for
inferences from that aggregated knowledge, it strongly incentivizes
corporations to keep on top of that information.180 Collective knowl-
edge pushes corporations toward investment without any recogni-
tion that, at some point, investments in compliance become socially
wasteful.181 What is more, the collective knowledge doctrine lacks
the capacity to recognize how the private and public stakes of
corporate compliance vary with corporation size and industry.182
Such a one-size-fits all approach may sometimes reach the right
176. See id. at 856-57.
177. See id.
178. Vincent Hendricks & John Symons, Epistemic Logic, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/logic-epistemic/
[https://perma.cc/FE9C-EXXW].
179. See id.
180. See Bharara, supra note 167, at 64-65.
181. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 341
(1996) (arguing that the imposition of criminal liability on corporations lacking the necessary
mens rea will force corporations to overinvest in precautions and forgo beneficial activities);
Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 35, at 242-43 (arguing that collective knowledge could
mean that “corporations with a desire to follow the law would have to implement massive and
unwieldy preventative measures to ensure as much”).
182. See Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 35, at 242-43.
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result, but, given the wide variety of corporations, it must necessar-
ily stray from the efficient point more often than not.
The collective knowledge doctrine also undermines corporate
criminal law’s retributive goals. Retribution requires making intu-
itive sense of Congress’s choice to define some crimes in terms of
knowledge and to pair those crimes with appropriate penalties.183
Treating defendants as though they know all the inferences of all
the things they know is deeply counterintuitive and inconsistent
with commonly accepted perspectives on knowledge.184 It risks
equating mere oversight with knowledge. This treats knowledge-
based crimes as requiring less than knowledge, something more
along the lines of negligence, or sometimes even strict liability.185
In so doing, the collective knowledge doctrine routinely punishes
corporations more than any intuitive reading of what Congress
deemed just.186
III. EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK
In order to argue that the coming proposal is better than current
doctrine, this Article needs an evaluative framework. The basic
values of corporate criminal law are familiar from the general part
of criminal law.187 Retribution188 and deterrence,189 which I touched
183. See infra Part III.B.
184. See Hendricks & Symons, supra note 178. But see PLATO, FIVE DIALOGUES:
EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, MENO, PHAEDO 58 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 2d ed. 2002).
185. Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 35, at 242-43.
186. See id. at 243.
187. See Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and
Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2010) (“[Corporate criminal law is t]he legal equivalent
of one-stop shopping, it promises consequential, retributive and expressive benefits, all at the
same time.”).
188. See Friedman, supra note 53, at 843 (“Criminal liability in turn expresses the
community’s condemnation of the wrongdoer’s conduct by emphasizing the standards for
appropriate behavior—that is, the standards by which persons and goods properly should be
valued.”); Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a
Justification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109, 124 (2010)
(“[R]etribution views punishment as an affirmation of intrinsic values essential to a civil
society.”); Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability,
82 IND. L.J. 411, 429 (2007) (“The corporation that transgresses that boundary can be as
subject to retribution as an individual.”).
189. See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1325 (2001) (“Corporate criminal law ... operates firmly in
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upon in the previous Part, tend to dominate the discussion, though
rehabilitation190 and incapacitation191 have started to make some
inroads. Prosecutors192 enforcing corporate criminal law and judg-
es sentencing corporations193 also acknowledge the importance of
these goals. The difficulty with using them for objective evaluative
purposes is that there is no agreement about which to prioritize.
This can be a serious problem for policy discussions since the goals
can pull in different directions.194 Deterrence theorists tend to think
the notion of corporate desert is incoherent,195 so the law should
focus instead on cost-benefit calculations.196 Retributivists think
cost-benefit calculations often let corporations escape their just
deserts197 and fail to send criminal law’s distinctively condemnatory
a deterrence mode.”); see, e.g., Khanna, supra note 65, at 1479 (embracing deterrence theory
for corporate crime).
190. See, e.g., Diamantis, supra note 31, at 509 (embracing a rehabilitation theory of
corporate punishment).
191. Incapacitation is often overlooked as a legitimate goal of corporate criminal law. But
as W. Robert Thomas argues, it should be part of the discussion. See W. Robert Thomas,
Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905 (2019).
192. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, § 9-28.200 (“Prosecutors should ensure that
the general purposes of the criminal law—appropriate punishment for the defendant,
deterrence of further criminal conduct by the defendant, deterrence of criminal conduct by
others, protection of the public from dangerous and fraudulent conduct, rehabilitation, and
restitution for victims—are adequately met, taking into account the special nature of the
corporate ‘person.’”).
193. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (“This chapter is designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations
and their agents, taken together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and
incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and
reporting criminal conduct.”).
194. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 401 (1958) (“Examination of the purposes commonly suggested for the criminal law will
show that each of them is complex and that none may be thought of as wholly excluding the
others.”); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 350 (1996) (“The idea that a single normative theory does or
should determine the shape of all criminal doctrines is exceedingly implausible.”).
195. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 1392 (“[A]ttributing blame to a corporation is no more
sensible than attributing blame to a dagger, a fountain pen, a Chevrolet, or any other
instrumentality of crime.”).
196. See Khanna, supra note 65, at 1478-79.
197. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1350 (1999) (“Many corporations simply purchase only the amount of
compliance necessary to effectively shift liability away from the firm. After risk of liability and
loss is transferred, the firm’s incentive to maintain high levels of care decreases.”). 
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message.198 Rehabilitation theorists think that deterrence and
retribution both end up unnecessarily burdening innocent corporate
stakeholders199 and favor a more constructive approach.200
This Article tries to sidestep the controversy over corporate crim-
inal law’s basic purpose by speaking to as many discussants as
possible within space constraints. It therefore focuses on, without
endorsing, both deterrence and retribution, leaving aside rehabilita-
tion and incapacitation, with apologies to theorists who favor those
purposes. This Part explores the implications that doctrines of cor-
porate knowledge have for deterrence and retribution in criminal
law. The initial discussion is at a high level and involves a number
of simplifications. But the abstract framework this Part builds is
enough to show that both deterrence and retribution theorists
should be deeply dissatisfied with current doctrines of corporate
knowledge. It also sets the stage for showing that the functional
approach proposed below is a win for both theories. This sort of
overlapping consensus holds the best chance of building the momen-
tum needed for real movement forward.201 If there is one unifying
note in corporate criminal law, it is the chorus for change.202
198. See Hart, supra note 194, at 404 (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction
and all that distinguishes it ... is the judgment of community condemnation which
accompanies and justifies its imposition.”); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic
Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-19 (1998) (“Just as crimes by natural persons
denigrate societal values, so do corporate crimes. Members of the public show that they feel
this way, for example, when they complain that corporations put profits ahead of the interests
of workers, consumers, or the environment. Punishing corporations, just like punishing
natural persons, is also understood to be the right way for society to repudiate the false
valuations that their crimes express. Criminal liability ‘sends the message’ that people matter
more than profits and reaffirms the value of those who were sacrificed to ‘corporate greed.’”
(footnotes omitted)).
199. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 1367 (“This punishment is inflicted instead on human
beings whose guilt remains unproven. Innocent shareholders pay the fines, and innocent
employees, creditors, customers, and communities sometimes feel the pinch too.”).
200. See Diamantis, supra note 31, at 509, 514-16.
201. See generally Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, The Mindsets of Political
Compromise, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 1125, 1125-43 (2010).
202. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647,
649 (1994) (“Liability rules for corporate actors in federal law are nearly a century old and
remain in an elementary and unsatisfactory form.”).
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A. Optimal Deterrence
Most discussions of “[c]orporate criminal law ... operate[ ] firmly
in a deterrence mode.”203 Even when deterrence-focused scholars
occasionally seem to tip their hats to alternate purposes, they usu-
ally translate these other purposes into terms that fit the cost-
benefit calculus of the deterrence framework.204 Deterrence theory
views criminal law in economic terms, as a tool to ensure that the
expected private costs of crime outweigh the expected private
benefits.205 From this perspective, punishment imposes a private
cost for criminal conduct.206 The expected private cost of punishment
is equal to the size of the sanction multiplied by the probability that
the sanction will be applied, that is, the probability of detection and
conviction.207 Rational utility maximizers will be deterred from
crime when the expected costs exceed expected criminal gains.208
There are two ways to tailor the expected private costs of punish-
ment in order to achieve optimal deterrence: by adjusting the size
of the sanction or by adjusting the probability that it will be ap-
plied.209 This Article takes the road less traveled by focusing on the
203. Brown, supra note 189, at 1325; see Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime,
and Theories of Punishment: A Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 7 (2002)
(“[T]he discussion of white collar crime is carried out in terms of deterrence.”). 
204. See Buell, supra note 118, at 500-12 (arguing that the reputational effects of criminal
convictions have unique deterrent effects on corporate behavior). But see Diamantis, supra
note 31, at 509-16; Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty By Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of
Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 413-20 (2012).
205. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime: An Economic
Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 30, at 11 (“The threat of sanction
is central to the deterrence of corporate crime.”).
206. Id. at 14-15 (“Within this rational-choice ‘deterrence’ framework, individuals weigh
the costs and benefits of crime-related activity against the expected sanction to maximize
their private utility under the constraints of the organization in which they find themselves.”).
207. Id. at 20-21 (“Detection and sanctions are substitutes in the production of
deterrence.... An enforcement authority can thus compensate for a tight budget (and thus
lower rate of detection) by aggressively seeking higher sanctions without significant loss of
general deterrence in this framework.”).
208. Id. at 14 (“[T]he lens of an economic model in which corporate crime is the outcome
of decisions of utility-maximizing individuals who have the ability to incur criminal liability
on behalf of the corporation.”).
209. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 193, 207 (1968) (arguing that an individual will choose whether to commit a crime based
upon both the form and severity of the punishment, as well as the likelihood that the
individual will be caught and convicted).
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latter. Most scholars in corporate criminal law primarily attend to
the size of the sanction as a low-cost way to modify corporate incen-
tives.210 To adjust the size of the sanction, the law just needs to cross
out one number and write a larger one.211 Many scholars seem to
have the perception that adjusting the probability that a sanction
will be applied requires expensive investments in enforcement
resources,212 but the law can also cheaply adjust the probability that
a sanction will be imposed by tailoring the liability standard. The
claim here is not that the best approach would be to fix liability
standards rather than adjust sanctions. Rather, it is that a two-
pronged approach stands the best chance of success, and liability
standards for attributing culpable knowledge have been mostly
overlooked.
As a guiding purpose of criminal liability, deterrence has special
appeal for corporate defendants. Unlike many other frameworks for
thinking about corporate punishment, such as retribution213 or vir-
tue ethics,214 it is fairly straightforward to see at first pass how de-
terrence can apply to entities such as corporations.215 We typically
210. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1205-14 (1985) (discussing the behavior which should be deterred by the criminal law,
and the sanctions to be applied to that behavior); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its
Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951 (2003) (arguing against deterrence theory based upon skepticism
regarding the law’s “ability to deter crime through the manipulation of criminal law rules and
penalties”).
211. See Posner, supra note 210, at 1206-07.
212. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 209, at 193-94 (arguing that an increase in the severity
of a fine does not require the public to pay for additional enforcement).
213. See Buell, supra note 118, at 475 (“Criminal law scholars have doubted the doctrine’s
theoretical soundness, pointing to illogic in retribution toward objects and the impossibility
of fitting liberal concepts about responsibility with nonhuman actors. Entity criminal liability,
these arguments go, is a purely imputed form of fault that has little or nothing to do with
blameworthiness. And the doctrine is concerned with the fault of something without free will
or character—that is, an apparition with ‘no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked.’”).
214. See Matthew Caulfield & William S. Laufer, The Promise of Corporate Character
Theory, 103 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 101, 115-19 (2018), https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/online/volume-
103/the-promise-of-corporate-character-theory/ [https://perma.cc/HA95-JVXT].
215. At a second pass, the picture is much more complicated. Corporations are run by
individuals whose incentives are not necessarily aligned with their corporate employers. See
Alexander & Cohen, supra note 205, at 14 (examining causes of corporate crime “through the
lens of an economic model in which corporate crime is the outcome of decisions by rational
utility-maximizing individuals who have the ability to incur criminal liability on behalf of the
corporation”). This is the perennial problem of agency costs. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark
A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime
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assume that corporations respond in rational ways to economic
considerations, and that assumption is all deterrence theory needs
to get going.216 There may even be reason to think deterrence works
better for corporate actors than for individuals.217 People are
frequently subject to irrational drives that are relatively insensitive
to economic calculus.218 Corporations do not suffer impulses, pas-
sions, hormonal imbalances, or drunkenness.219 Although their
human constituents are influenced by emotion, corporations have
procedures, checks, and balances that should filter these out in the
ordinary course of business.220
Another important feature of corporations’ decision-making
structure (and another disanalogy to the case of natural individuals)
is that they are malleable in response to the right incentives. While
people cannot reorganize their psychology, corporations can.221 This
is something legal policymakers bank on.222 Judges and prosecutors
as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 4 (1999). There are ways to mitigate agency costs, and
I have written about some of them. See Diamantis, supra note 28, at 514-16. But that dis-
cussion can only take place once we have a sense of how incentives operate at the corporate
level. It is at this level that the argument here proceeds.
216. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 205, at 17 (“Instead of focusing on individual
actions, we can consider crime as the outcome of company-level decisions.”).
217. See Harvey M. Silets & Susan E. Brenner, The Demise of Rehabilitation: Sentencing
Reform and the Sanctioning of Organizational Criminality, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 367 (1986)
(“The corporation is a rational actor striving to maximize financial gain and minimize
financial loss, and so can be manipulated most easily by imposing monetary penalties that
affect these acts.” (footnotes omitted)). For various reasons having to do with corporate
governance and structure, I and others have noted that this is likely an idealization. See, e.g.,
Diamantis, supra note 31, at 525-27 (noting that corporations could respond to government
incentives by concealing rather than complying); id. at 565-68 (describing how corporate fines
fail to target the right individuals); Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation:
A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 354-55 (1979). Future work on
corporate knowledge should complicate the picture by accounting for how reality departs form
this ideal or providing mechanisms for bringing reality closer into line with it.
218. Robinson & Darley, supra note 210, at 955 (“[T]here is a host of conditions that
interfere with the rational calculation of self-interest by potential offenders: drug or alcohol
use, personality types inclined toward impulsiveness and toward discounting consequences,
and social influences such as the arousal effect of group action and the tendency of group
members to calculate risk in terms of group rather than individual interests.”).
219. See Silets & Brenner, supra note 217, at 355 (“[I]ndividuals commit crimes of passion,
whereas corporations do not.”).
220. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Sanctioning Corporations, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 24-29 (2010)
(discussing the “practical personality” of corporations). 
221. See Diamantis, supra note 31, at 538-39.
222. See id.
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already give corporations reasons to be proactive about compli-
ance.223 The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines offer corpora-
tions sentencing reductions if they have “effective compliance and
ethics program[s].”224 Corporations also know that their commit-
ment to compliance can play an important role in how favorably
prosecutors exercise their charging discretion.225 If criminal law
gives corporations incentives to know or not to know something
(e.g., by making such knowledge an element of a crime), they will
find any available way to adapt—by implementing new policies and
procedures, replacing or retraining employees, and reorganizing
their corporate structure.226 The equivalent adaptations for individu-
als would require a reordering that is biologically and psychologi-
cally impossible.227
Most deterrence theorists working on corporate crime are not out
to deter all crime at all costs; rather, they aim for optimal deter-
rence.228 One straightforward way to disincentivize all crime force-
fully would be to impose the maximum sanction in all cases.229 This,
however, would be suboptimal in part because it would lead to
socially wasteful over-deterrence; it would punish criminals more
223. See id.
224. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
225. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE
WITH CORPORATIONS (2014) (discussing prosecutorial discretion, deferred prosecution
agreements, and the role of structural reform in both). Department of Justice’s Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations explicitly direct line prosecutors to consider
“the adequacy and effectiveness of the corporation’s compliance program at the time of the
offense” when “determining whether to bring charges” against corporate suspects. U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.300 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-
principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations [https://perma.cc/RHW9-XTK2].
226. See Brown, supra note 189, at 1338.
227. See generally WILLIAM P. ALSTON, EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY
OF KNOWLEDGE (1989) (discussing the involuntariness of belief formation for individuals).
228. PAUL ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 81 (2017)
(“Punishment imposes costs on the state as well as on the person punished; accordingly, the
punishment should be set just high enough to maximize deterrence (or, more precisely, to
achieve the efficient rate of deterrence, where the net benefit of crime prevention relative to
its cost is highest), but no higher.”). 
229. See id. (“It may seem as if a deterrence-based scheme would frequently impose the
harshest sentence allowed, to maximize the potential cost of committing a crime and thereby
discourage would-be offenders as much as possible. Yet if an offender thinks he is already
subject to the maximum punishment (if he is caught), then it becomes almost impossible to
deter any further criminal activity on his part.”).
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than needed to deter them230 and would spill over to chill socially
beneficial activities.231 The law optimizes its deterrent purposes and
promotes material social welfare only if the harms that punishment
prevents outweigh the social costs it imposes.232 The goal of optimal
deterrence is to increase the private costs of crime just enough to
align private incentives with the socially optimal level of such
activities.233
At first, talk of socially optimal levels of crime can sound
paradoxical. Is the socially optimal level of crime not zero? While
civil law often aims at efficient levels of breach—as in contracts234
or torts235—the whole point of criminal law is to prohibit categori-
cally.236 Yet there are social costs associated with getting crime
down to zero. A polity could, for example, reduce the incidence of
230. See Becker, supra note 209, at 209 (“[O]ptimal policies to combat illegal behavior are
part of an optimal allocation of resources.”).
231. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stien, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1748-49
(2005) (“Consider a situation in which the optimal sanction for deterring a certain type of
conduct (representing the total harm that society wants to avoid) equals x, the average
spillover addition to the sanction for such conduct equals y, and a rational individual is
contemplating a course of action that falls within the sphere of conduct at issue. This
individual will take the contemplated action if its expected benefit to him or her (b) is greater
than x + y. From a classic social utility standpoint, the individual should take the action
whenever b > x. In any such case, the aggregate social welfare would be greater than it was
before. The individual, however, will not take the action when x < b < x + y, which implies that
y—the spillover addition to the optimal sanction—is generally detrimental to society.”).
232. Id.
233. See id.
234. Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) (“Repudiation of obligations should be
encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in
as good a position as he would have occupied had performance been rendered.”). For an
illustration of efficient breach doctrine, see Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
151 (8th ed. 2011).
235. The Hand Formula states that, in a negligence action, a defendant meets the standard
of care when the burden of avoiding an injury is greater than the loss which would result from
that injury multiplied by the probability that the injury will come to pass. United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
236. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193-94 (1991);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1691 (1976) (“In this dimension, we place at one pole legal institutions whose purpose is to
prevent people from engaging in particular activities because those activities are morally
wrong or otherwise flatly undesirable. Most of the law of crimes fits this pattern: laws against
murder aim to eliminate murder. At the other pole are legal institutions whose stated object
is to facilitate private ordering.”).
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drunken driving by prohibiting cars; yet, the social costs of doing so
would be extraordinary. Optimal deterrence theorists seek to strike
a balance between the costs of prevention and the costs of what-
ever misconduct will escape prevention.237 By dialing up one side of
the equation, the law can dial down the other until they are in
equipoise.
The stakes for getting these incentives right for corporate actors
range between the massive social benefits and potential harms
characteristic of corporate activity. Corporations were originally
created238 and continue to be justified239 by the fact that they are the
central engines of economic and material gain. Corporations now
account for two-thirds of total business revenue in the United
States.240 Innovation in the corporate form is widely credited with
the United States’ economic ascendance in the twentieth century.241
Policies that chill how corporations pursue business advantage
impact whether and how quickly corporations can create these
material advances.242
Despite their welfare-promoting features, corporations can also
create costs of all sorts—economic,243 environmental,244 public
237. See Peter N. Salib, Why Prison?: An Economic Critique, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 111,
120 (2017) (“Optimal deterrence does not simply mean setting the penalties correctly to deter
each particular crime. Rather, the system of deterrence must be coherent, minimizing the
overall social losses from bad actions. As such, optimally deterrent penalties cannot be
calculated narrowly, considering only the expected value of a single crime. They must consider
how to best penalize the whole range of bad acts in which a bad actor might engage. The
penalties for less-harmful bad acts should be lower than those for the most serious ones.”).
238. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci et al., The Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 193, 194 (2017) (“The corporate form was originally established for public bodies and
public utilities, such as a municipality or a monastery.”).
239. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, How Great Companies Think Differently, 89 HARV. BUS.
REV. 66, 68 (2011) (“Institutional logic holds that companies are more than instruments for
generating money; they are also vehicles for accomplishing societal purposes and for providing
meaningful livelihoods for those who work in them.”).
240. See Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporations Make Up 5 Percent of Busi-
nesses but Earn 62 Percent of Revenues, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 25, 2014), https://taxfoundation.
org/corporations-make-5-percent-businesses-earn-62-percent-revenues/ [https://perma.cc/N8
SR-DBFW].
241. See, e.g., JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY 103 (2003).
242. See David Ahlstrom, Innovation and Growth: How Business Contributes to Society, 24
ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 11, 13-21 (2010) (arguing that disruptive innovation by economic actors
is necessary for economic growth).
243. See, e.g., Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1932
(2017) (“Upon uncovering the LIBOR manipulation scheme, regulators worldwide fined all
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health,245 dignity,246 etc. Because of corporations’ place of privilege
as the driving force in our economy, those costs can be staggering.247
Even some of the staunchest advocates of free-market economics
concede that limits must be placed on corporations’ pursuit of profit
if it is ultimately to benefit, rather than harm, society.248
participating banks approximately $14 billion in total—a pittance compared to the illicit
profits earned throughout the life of the manipulation scheme. The LIBOR manipulation
scandal was expansive, impacting trillions of dollars of financial contracts—but, frighteningly,
it typifies benchmark manipulation.”).
244. See Hope M. Babcock, Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate
“Greenwashing” or a Corporate Culture Game Changer?, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8
(2010) (“For many large firms, penalties are merely a cost of doing business, particularly if
the penalty does not recapture for the public the benefits that inured to the company from
violating the law.”).
245. See Nicholas Freudenberg & Sandro Galea, The Impact of Corporate Practices on
Health: Implications for Health Policy, 29 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 86, 86 (2008) (“Recently,
policy makers, the media, advocates, and the public have called attention to the impact of
corporate activities on health and disease in the United States. High-profile cases that have
galvanized public discourse include the tobacco settlement that was designed to provide
compensation to states for tobacco-related illness, wide-spread debate over the responsibility
of the food and beverage industry for the current epidemic of obesity, and discussions about
drug company profits and harmful product side effects.”).
246. See Richard C. Chen, Note, Organizational Irrationality and Corporate Human Rights
Violations, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1931 (2009) (“Today, individual corporations can wield
as much power and influence as entire nations. Unfortunately, that influence is not neces-
sarily wielded for good, as corporations have been implicated in a broad range of human rights
abuses.” (footnote omitted)).
247. See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (2009) (“Modern corporations not only wield virtually unprecedented
power, but they do so in a fashion that often causes serious harm to both individuals and to
society as a whole.”).
248. See Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for
a Basic Income, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1221 (“Although classical liberals—like minimal state
libertarians—oppose large scale welfare programs and reject much current governmental
regulation, they admit that in some instances the government can engage in activities beyond
acting as a night watchman, such as providing public goods, prohibiting monopolies, and
reducing negative externalities.” (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A
MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 1-12 (2003))); Christian Leuz, We Need Smarter
Regulation, Not More, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2009), https://www.forbes.com/ 2009/02/09/ dynamic-
financial-regulation-opinions-contributors_0209_ christian_leuz.html [https://perma.cc/S6XG-
4X3S] (“Financial regulation imposes significant costs on the economy.... In fact, current calls
for regulation come at the same time that market discipline is back in full force and more
regulatory scrutiny could exacerbate the downturn. Thus, what we need to prevent future
crises is a more dynamic approach to regulation and oversight—one that is strong precisely
when market forces become weak.”). But see THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS: A CITIZEN’S
GUIDE TO THE ECONOMY 95 (2000).
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The central task for optimal deterrence theorists working on cor-
porate crime is to find the socially optimal level of corporate invest-
ment in compliance (crime prevention) and then to use criminal
sanctions to incentivize corporations to invest at that level.249 They,
therefore, need a model for comparing the costs and benefits, both
public and private, of the alternative liability regimes. So far, as
doctrines of corporate knowledge are concerned, there are two main
costs to bear in mind. The first, already mentioned, is the massive
costs of corporate misconduct.250 Some white-collar crimes, such as
securities fraud, involve illegitimate transfers of wealth that may
not immediately create net social losses ($5 is $5, regardless of
whose pocket it is in), but they undermine mechanisms that are
essential to an efficient market economy.251 Others, such as envi-
ronmental or public health violations, create more direct social
losses.252 The less knowledge that a doctrine incentivizes corpo-
rations to have, the greater the costs of corporate crime. This is
because corporations, knowing less about their own operations, will
be less able to anticipate and prevent their own misconduct.253
Furthermore, criminal law will have fewer resources to address and
remedy corporate misconduct because corporations lacking knowl-
edge cannot be convicted of and sanctioned for knowledge-based
crimes.254
249. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 1360.
250. See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1894
(2013).
251. Id. at 1887 (“In addition to undermining investor confidence, misreporting distorts
economic decision making by all firms, both those committing fraud and those not. False
information impairs risk assessment by those who provide human or financial capital to
fraudulent firms, the firms’ suppliers and customers, and thus misdirects capital and labor
to subpar projects.”); I. J. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive is
Corporate Fraud? 1 (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2222608, 2013) (“Combining
this information with cost estimates suggests that in the 1996-2004 period fraud in large
corporations destroyed between $180 and $360 billion a year.”).
252. See, e.g., Dominic Rushe, BP Set to Pay Largest Environmental Fine in US History
for Gulf Oil Spill, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2015, 12:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/en
vironment/2015/jul/02/bp-will-pay-largest-environmental-fine-in-us-history-for-gulf-oil-spill
[https://perma.cc/V5CZ-6HYY] (“More than five years after the disaster, environmentalists
and Gulf residents are still counting the cost. Fatalities among dolphins and other marine life
have surged in the spill’s aftermath.”).
253. See Luban, supra note 94, at 963.
254. See id.
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The second cost that an efficient doctrine of corporate knowledge
should seek to minimize is what I will broadly call the “costs of
compliance.” In order to know things relevant to potential miscon-
duct, corporations must acquire and process information using
internal compliance mechanisms.255 Compliance programs are not
cheap.256 The amount of money corporations spend annually to
design and implement compliance mechanisms has ballooned in
recent years.257 The number of private corporate compliance officers
is on pace to overtake the number of municipal police in some large
jurisdictions.258 These figures—which do not include the opportunity
costs of diverting cash from productive uses to compliance—under-
represent the true cost of compliance.259 Corporate scholars, even
those not generally friendly to corporate interests, are starting to
sound the alarm.260
It is important to resist the urge to press corporations to spend
whatever it takes to prevent as much misconduct as possible. No
compliance program is failproof.261 No matter how much corpora-
tions spend on compliance, they cannot monitor their employees
perfectly262 and some misconduct will pass under the radar.263 As
such, there is always room for improvement and no limit to the
255. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 693 (1997).
256. Lucy McNulty, Compliance Costs to More Than Double by 2022, FIN. NEWS LONDON
(April 27, 2017, 3:15 PM), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/compliance-costs-to-more-than-
double-by-2022-survey-finds-20170427 [https://perma.cc/U78Y-9XTX].
257. Id. (“The survey found that firms typically spend 4% of their total revenue on
compliance, but that could rise to 10% by 2022, with around nine out of ten of those polled
stating that regulatory reforms were increasing their compliance costs.”).
258. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 392.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. Henry L. Tosi et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control: Increasing the
Responsiveness of Boards of Directors to Shareholders’ Interests?, 4 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
39, 46 (1991).
262. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 782 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976); Tosi et al., supra note 261, at 46 (“[E]ven if the principle is
willing to incur agency costs of monitoring, it may still be difficult to effectively control
agents.”).
263. See Irwin Schwartz, Toward Improving the Law and Policy of Corporate Criminal
Liability and Sanctions, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 112 (2014) (“No organization—private or
government—can prevent all misconduct by all employees, all of the time.”).
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amount corporations could invest in compliance for some marginal
reduction in the risk of misconduct.264 It is too easy to discount the
costs of compliance as private costs borne by faceless corporate
fictions. Because of corporations’ economic role and the porous line
between corporations and the investing public, these costs can have
detrimental social effects.265 At some point, corporate costs ripple
beyond the faceless corporation to the broader public: 401k holders,
job-seekers, consumers, etc.266
Optimal deterrence requires balancing the costs of crime and the
costs of compliance. The important thing to pay attention to is not
the absolute values of the two costs, but the dynamic relationship
between them. As compliance expenditures increase, assuming they
are effectively spent,267 the expected costs of crime should de-
crease.268 So long as a marginal increase in compliance expenditures
creates a larger marginal reduction in the expected costs of crime,
the costs are efficient from an optimal deterrence perspective.269 But
there are diminishing marginal returns from compliance expendi-
tures.270 In other words, after a point, an additional dollar spent on
compliance will reduce the expected costs of crime by less than a
264. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 181, at 324.
265. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 1367.
266. See id.
267. As William Laufer persuasively argues, this is a disputable assumption. WILLIAM S.
LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS 103-04 (2006) (arguing that prosecutors lack
guidelines for measuring whether a compliance program is effective, and therefore lack any
guidance regarding whether a corporation effectively spends on compliance). But, as I argue
elsewhere, there are things the law could be doing to make sure corporations are spending
compliance money more effectively. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Looking Glass: A Reply to
Caulfield and Laufer, 103 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 147, 152 (2019), https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/
assets/Uploads/ILROnline103-Hasnas.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB44-TSE2].
268. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 181, at 329.
269. See id.
270. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 254-55 (Jennifer
Arlen ed., 2018) (explaining that a firm’s probability of avoiding penalty increases with each
dollar it spends on compliance, but at a decreasing rate per each additional dollar).
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dollar.271 Further investment in compliance would be, beyond that
point, socially wasteful.272
There is a socially optimal level for corporations to invest in
compliance, and that level is less than everything.273 Social welfare
would benefit from a doctrine of corporate knowledge that could
induce corporations to invest closer to that optimal level.274 It is easy
to see that current doctrines of corporate knowledge must stray far
from the mark.275 Something more flexible, like the coming proposal,
could bring the law closer to it.
The way doctrines of knowledge can help induce corporations to
strike the right balance between the costs of compliance and the
costs of crime is to alter their private incentives to acquire
compliance-relevant knowledge or to remain ignorant of it. The
interplay between the relevant incentives is not straightforward—as
explained above, knowledge is a mixed proposition for corpora-
tions.276 The private benefit of corporate knowledge is easy to
anticipate. The more corporations know about the activities of their
employees, the better they can intervene when there is a risk of
misconduct.277 This helps corporations limit their future criminal
liabilities by reducing the probability that they commit crimes.278
271. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 181, at 324 (“It is plainly undesirable for firms to
invest infinite resources to prevent their agents’ parties from committing crimes, even if those
crimes themselves are clearly unproductive. Rather, monitoring is desirable, as a first approx-
imation, up to the point at which the marginal cost would exceed the marginal social gain in
the form of reduced social harm from criminal activity.”).
272. Id.
273. See Coffee, supra note 236, at 196 (“Once it is conceded that some level of monitoring
could be excessive, then the cost to the corporation must be compared to the benefit to
society.” (footnote omitted)).
274. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 1367.
275. See, e.g., Joe Mont, Ex-Wells Fargo CEO Slams ‘Absurd’ Compliance Spending,
COMPLIANCE WK. (May 29, 2015), http://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the-filing-cabinet/ex-
wells-fargo-ceo-slams-absurd-compliance-spending [https://perma.cc/MD6B-D3KH]; Rushe,
supra note 252.
276. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. This paper focuses on the incentives
that doctrines of corporate criminal law give corporations. These doctrines are doctored and
tailored, sometimes for better and sometimes for worse, by various actors in the legal system,
most notably prosecutors and judges. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text. A more
nuanced model would account for these interventions too, but I think they are safe to ignore
for present purposes. An efficient doctrine is better than an inefficient one that legal actors
may make efficient through case-by-case, ad hoc uses of discretion.
277. See Luban, supra note 94, at 959.
278. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 181, at 324.
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But there are significant private costs too.279 The compliance costs
of implementing and running mechanisms to gather and process
information are the most obvious.280 Perhaps less obvious, but no
less significant, is the potential increase in criminal liability for
corporations when they know more.281 For knowledge-based crimes,
the more a corporation knows, the more vulnerable it is when mis-
conduct occurs.282 Identical conduct can be criminal or not, depend-
ing on how much the corporation knew.283
Optimal deterrence theorists will want to incentivize corporations
to gather information at the socially optimal level.284 This is where
legal doctrines for attributing knowledge to corporations can have
a role. By defining knowledge more expansively or less expansively,
to include more or fewer types of information, the law can affect
corporate incentives to know that information.285 If the law treats
corporations as though they know some information, then corpora-
tions anxious to manage their liabilities will have strong incentives
to gather and process that information.286 They are on the hook for
it anyway since it may satisfy the mens rea element of a crime.287 If
the law does not treat corporations as knowing some information,
corporations will have correspondingly weaker incentives to gather
and process it.288 By tweaking the boundary between what the law
considers knowledge and mere information, the law can push cor-
porate incentives toward the optimal point.289
279. Mont, supra note 275.
280. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 181, at 324.
281. See Luban, supra note 94, at 959.
282. See Coffee, supra note 236, at 230.
283. See id. at 213.
284. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 1360 (“A judge’s goal in punishing a corporation
should be to induce a level of monitoring that will prevent more criminal harm than the
monitoring will cost.”).
285. See Luban, supra note 94, at 959.
286. Just how big the incentive is depends on the probability of detection by authorities and
the size of the sanction. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 255, at 703 (“The firm, in an effort to
choose the level of prevention that minimizes its own total costs, will select the level that
minimizes total social costs as well. The sanction which achieves this aim is the same as that
which induces optimal activity levels, i.e., the social cost of wrongdoing divided by its proba-
bility of detection.” (footnote omitted)).
287. See Coffee, supra note 236, at 198.
288. See Luban, supra note 94, at 959.
289. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 139, at 291 (“From the firm’s perspective,
investment in compliance is valuable only to the extent that it reduces expected liability
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As framed here, optimal deterrence can give a powerful critical
perspective. Optimal deterrence shows we should be skeptical of
simplistic doctrines of knowledge that push corporations in just one
direction or another—toward more knowledge (like the collective
knowledge doctrine) or more ignorance (like respondeat superior).
The socially optimal point is a balance between the costs of compli-
ance and the costs of crime.290 Getting corporations to invest at that
point requires a new doctrine capable of dynamically altering corpo-
rations’ incentives to know information or to remain ignorant of it.
Optimal deterrence also suggests that we should be skeptical of
one-size-fits-all knowledge doctrines, such as both respondeat su-
perior and the collective knowledge doctrine. While we lack detailed
numbers on the costs of compliance and criminal liability that
corporations face, those numbers vary dramatically from one cor-
poration to the next.291 Corporations range in size from small mom-
and-pop operations to familiar corporate giants such as Walmart
and Amazon.292 Compliance and information management sys-
tems are quite different mechanisms for different sized organiza-
tions,293 involving wide-ranging real and proportional costs.294 Cor-
porate risks and compliance needs also vary by industry.295 Some
costs.”).
290. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 181, at 324.
291. John Schneider, Finding Your Cost-of-Compliance Sweet Spot, STRATEGIC FIN., Aug.
2007, at 30.
292. Biggest Employers, FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/list/filtered?sortBy=
employees&first500 [https://perma.cc/RFU4-R2EA].
293. Schneider, supra note 291, at 30 (“An important first step is to acknowledge that the
cost of compliance is an ingredient of a broader effort for a governance and risk management
infrastructure to protect the company’s reputation. Each industry is slightly different and,
therefore, comes with a unique set of economic decisions that will factor into determining how
much is enough.”).
294. William Dunkelberg, The Hidden Costs of Regulations, FORBES (July 12, 2016, 3:02
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamdunkelberg/2016/07/12/the-cost-of-regulations/
[https://perma.cc/ETR8-XUJZ] (“The negative impact of these regulatory burdens varies
significantly by firm size. Regulations do not have the same economic impact on large and
small firms, the latter being less well-staffed and resourced to deal with the regulatory
avalanche. For example, it is estimated that compliance with EPA regulations cost four times
as much per employee for small firms as for large ones.”).
295. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2075, 2099-2101 (2016) (“Having mapped the common core of compliance, the question
of how companies operationalize the basic structure remains. This is where differences
emerge among firms, especially among firms in different industry categories. For example,
firms in some industries—most notably financial services, pharmaceuticals, and defense/
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industries, such as the energy sector, involve notoriously high risk
of criminal misconduct; others, such as education, have fewer
compliance needs.296 Doctrines that are invariant across industry
and size will inevitably fail to produce satisfactory results in the
majority of cases.
B. Retribution
Deterrence may be most scholars’ favorite framing purpose for
corporate criminal law, but retributivism arguably plays a greater
political and social role. Retributivists generally think that the
justifying purpose of criminal law is to give criminals what they
deserve.297 Accordingly, justice requires the punishment of wrong-
doers298 in proportion to the severity of their crimes.299 Retributive
sentiments toward corporate criminals are plain in the popular
press and fuel public pressure on political actors to respond in
kind.300
There is no way to talk seriously about retributive appropriate-
ness for corporate criminals without wading into deep theoretical
controversy. This is not the place to rehash the competing varieties
of retributivism and their relative merits in corporate criminal law.
I have previously argued that the best way to think about desert for
aerospace—are often seen as having more highly developed compliance functions.”). 
296. PONEMON INSTITUTE, THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE: A BENCHMARK STUDY OF
MULTINATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2011), https://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/ True_
Cost_of_Compliance_Report_copy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XWD-A468].
297. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (John Ladd trans.,
2nd ed. 1999).
298. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991);
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 196 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) (“[T]he undeserved
evil which anyone commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself.”); see
Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE
EMOTIONS 179 (F. Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Retributivism is the view that punishment is
justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it.”).
299. Michael S. Moore, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV 1749, 1751 (1994) (“Such
purposes are themselves subservient to the overarching purpose of criminal punishment,
which is retributive: people should be punished because of (and only in proportion to) their
moral deserts.”).
300. See Baer, supra note 64, at 612 (“The public has increasingly registered greater moral
outrage in response to corporate governance scandals. Moral outrage, in turn, fuels retributive
motivations and therefore supports those institutions best poised to take advantage of such
motivations.”).
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corporations is along the lines Paul Robinson proposes more gener-
ally for criminal law: that liability standards should be keyed to folk
intuitions about justice and condemnation.301 In a pluralistic, demo-
cratic polity, I believe it is hard to motivate any other retributive
approach.302
Cognitive scientists and psychologists know how people ordinarily
think about corporate culpability. The public “perc[eives] that corpo-
rations are ‘alive,’ and can act, through their agents, in specific
ways.”303 People commonly speak of corporations “as ‘real’ entities
in ordinary language and in moral discourse.”304 Even the most
cursory review of how we talk about corporations reveals that we
widely treat them to the whole array of reactive attitudes we reserve
for anyone capable of having guilty knowledge.305 Recall the recent
and continuing Volkswagen (VW) scandal. The news was filled with
reporting about whether VW knew about the emissions defeat
devices,306 or whether, as VW initially alleged, some rogue engineers
implanted the devices and hid the scheme from the company.307 The
carmaker’s liability in the public eye and in the eyes of the law
turned on that question.308
301. See Diamantis, supra note 11, at 2052-53. See generally ROBINSON, supra note 54
(describing the “care” of wrongdoing).
302. See W. Robert Thomas, Criminal Law and Corporate Moral Agency: A View from
Political Philosophy, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2019). 
303. Friedman, supra note 53, at 847.
304. Eric Colvin, Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability, 6 CRIM. L. F. 1, 24 (1995).
305. See Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz, Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental
Studies, 7 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 67, 73-74 (2008) (using data from Google
searches of ordinary language to establish this point).
306. Ashlee Kieler, Report: Volkswagen Knew of Defeat Devices Eight Years Before EPA
Action, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 28, 2015), https://consumerist.com/2015/09/28/report-volkswagen-
knew-of-defeat-devices-eight-years-before-epa-action/ [https://perma.cc/CEJ5-E2GV]; Rob
Stumpf, Volkswagen CEO Reportedly Knew of Diesel Cheating Months Before It Became
Public, DRIVE (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.thedrive.com/ sheetmetal/13814/volkswagen-ceo-
reportedly-knew-of-diesel-cheating-months-before-it-became-public [https://perma.cc/UF3P-
QSZ5].
307. Jim Puzzanghera & Jerry Hirsch, VW Exec Blames “A Couple of Rogue Engineers” for
Emissions Scandal, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
autos/la-fi-hy-vw-hearing-20151009-story.html [https://perma.cc/5E3S-KBVE].
308. In its plea deal, Volkswagen admitted to knowingly entering a conspiracy, knowingly
obstructing justice, and knowingly using false statements to enter goods into U.S. commerce.
See Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil
Penalties; Six Volkswagen Executives and Employees Are Indicted in Connection with
Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.
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Our intuitive disposition to treat corporations as though they are
entities, capable of culpably knowing things, seems to be a hard-
wired feature of our psychology. Cognitive scientists have recently
begun studying the phenomenon. When groups exhibit high levels
of coherence, as do most corporations,309 humans come to conceive
of them as possessing many of the attributes traditionally asso-
ciated with individuals.310 Cognitive scientists and social psy-
chologists call this cohesive property of groups “entitativity,” which
they define as being “a unified and coherent whole in which the
members are tightly bound together” by, for example, a collective
goal such as profitmaking.311 The shift in conception of sufficiently
cohesive groups happens at a fundamental level in cognition.312
Research indicates that the human mind represents such groups as
unified entities, rather than as collections of individuals.313 Our
propensity to treat corporations as we treat other epistemic subjects
is tied to the role that entitative groups play in our mental econ-
omy.314 Not only does the entitativity of corporations make “blame
justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-criminal-and-civil-
penalties-six [https://perma.cc/R4FA-BW3T].
309. See Brian Lickel et al., Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity,
78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 229 (2000); Steven J. Sherman & Elise J. Percy, The
Psychology of Collective Responsibility: When and Why Collective Entities Are Likely to Be
Held Responsible for the Misdeeds of Individual Members, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 150 (2010). See
generally Brian Lickel et al., Intuitive Theories of Group Types and Relational Principles, 42
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 28 (2006) (discussing features of groups that incline people
to see them as entitative and capable of bearing collective responsibility).
310. See David L. Hamilton & Steven J. Sherman, Perceiving Persons and Groups, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 336, 337-41 (1996); Sherman & Percy, supra note 309, at 139-40, 149.
311. Sherman & Percy, supra note 309, at 149-50; see Donald T. Campbell, Common Fate,
Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities, 3
BEHAV. SCI. 14, 17 (1958); Lloyd Sandelands & Lynda St. Clair, Toward an Empirical Concept
of Group, 23 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 423, 453 (1993) (providing “evidence for the existence of
groups as entities”). See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP PERCEPTION: PERCEIVED
VARIABILITY, ENTITATIVITY, AND ESSENTIALISM (Vincent Yzerbyt et al. eds., 2003).
312. See Amy L. Johnson & Sarah Queller, The Mental Representations of High and Low
Entitativity Groups, 21 SOC. COGNITION 101, 105-06 (2003) (providing evidence of a basic shift
in cognition toward groups with high versus low entitativity); Nadzeya Svirydzenka, Group
Entitativity and Its Perceptual Antecedents in Varieties of Groups: A Developmental
Perspective, 40 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 611, 615 (2010) (demonstrating that children also make
assessments about group entitativity).
313. See Marilynn B. Brewer & Amy S. Harasty, Seeing Groups as Entities: The Role of
Perceiver Motivation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION 347, 353 (Richard M.
Sorrentino & E. Tory Higgins eds., 1996); Sherman & Percy, supra note 309, at 152.
314. See Sherman & Percy, supra note 309, at 152.
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and punishment [of them] ... psychologically sensible and sustain-
able,”315 but it strongly inclines us to treat them that way.316 We
are psychologically committed to a criminal law that treats corpo-
rations like individuals.
Since there is less corporate scholarship on retribution than
deterrence,317 I will have correspondingly less to say by way of
ground setting beyond these observations about the psychology of
corporate blame. I will not question whether retributivism for cor-
porate criminals is theoretically defensible. Rather, I will meet retri-
butivists on their own grounds and show how competing doctrines
of corporate knowledge can promote or hinder retributivism’s goals.
Attributions of corporate knowledge can do this by mirroring or
conflicting with widespread intuitions about corporate justice and
desert.318 I argue below that the approach to corporate knowledge I
propose does this better than current doctrine. Respondeat superior
allows corporations to escape liability even when they do things that
are plainly wrong.319 And the collective knowledge doctrine risks
treating corporations as though they are logically omniscient.320
Both current doctrines stray from common intuition.
If doctrines of corporate knowledge are going to facilitate criminal
law’s retributive goals, they must make sense of corporate knowl-
edge as a species of knowledge. This means the doctrine should
315. Id. at 156; see Thomas F. Denson et al., The Roles of Entitativity and Essentiality in
Judgments of Collective Responsibility, 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 43, 55-56
(2006); Anna-Kaisa Newheiser et al., Why Do We Punish Groups? High Entitativity Promotes
Moral Suspicion, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 931, 931-32 (2012) (arguing that people
are naturally inclined to blame entitative groups for wrongdoing).
316. See Koichi Hioki & Minoru Karasawa, Effects of Group Entitativity on the Judgment
of Collective Intentionality and Responsibility, 81 JAPANESE J. PSYCHOL. 9 (2010) (finding that
people are more likely to attribute intentionality and criminal responsibility to groups with
high entitativity).
317. Though they are relatively few in number, there are some scholars who have
undertaken the project of spelling out a notion of corporate desert. See, e.g., KIP SCHLEGEL,
JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS 3-5 (1990); Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 797 (1992).
318. See generally ROBINSON, supra note 54; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions
of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007)
(“[W]e are suggesting that the belief that serious wrongdoing should be punished and the
culturally shared judgments of the relative blameworthiness of different acts of wrongdoing
are commonly intuitive rather than reasoned judgments.”). 
319. See supra Part II.A.
320. See supra Part II.B.
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roughly align with ordinary intuitions about when groups know
things. It also means that whatever it qualifies as knowledge should
have the same normative salience that knowledge does when it
serves as the mens rea element of a crime. Mens rea grades the
seriousness of crimes and the appropriate punitive response.321 For
example, crimes that require culpable knowledge are more serious
than crimes that only require recklessness or negligence, and less
serious than those that require purpose.322 As a consequence, the
law generally punishes knowledge-based crimes more severely than
the former, but less severely than the latter.323 As argued in the
previous Part, the law is presently stuck misconstruing corporate
knowledge standards as more demanding (respondeat superior) or
less demanding (collective knowledge) than it should. As such, the
law distorts Congress’s efforts (such as they are) to pair crimes with
punishments that are retributively appropriate.
IV. A FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE
The two available doctrines for attributing knowledge to corpo-
rations fall short of achieving optimal deterrence and retributive
justice, but for opposite reasons. Respondeat superior overly re-
stricts what counts as corporate knowledge.324 It thereby incen-
tivizes corporations to let important information lay uncollected and
unprocessed, and allows them to escape just punishment.325 The
collective knowledge doctrine responds to these critical failings of
respondeat superior, but goes too far by treating too much as
knowledge.326 It thereby incentivizes corporations to invest in
321. Robinson & Grall, supra note 87, at 689-90.
322. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 explanatory note to subsection (10) (AM. LAW INST. 1962)
(“Subsection (10) applies when the grade or degree of an offense depends on the culpability
with which the offense is committed.... [T]he defendant’s level of culpability should be
measured by an examination of his mental state with respect to all elements of the offense.
Thus, if the defendant purposely kills but does so in the negligent belief that it is necessary
in order to save his own life, his degree of liability should be measured by assimilating him
to one who is negligent rather than to one who acts purposely.”).
323. Id. § 2.02(10).
324. See supra Part II.A.
325. See supra Part II.A.
326. See supra Part II.B.
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compliance at socially wasteful levels and unjustly punishes them.327
Neither doctrine has the nuance to strike a balance between knowl-
edge and mere information or to recognize that the balance may
vary with basic features of the corporation whose knowledge is at
issue. What we need is a Goldilocks solution, a way to draw a line
between the over- and under-permissiveness of current law. The
solution should also be a functional account, that is to say, one that
allows the line to shift as a function of relevant characteristics of the
corporate defendant and of the sort of information at issue.
Between them, respondeat superior and the collective knowledge
doctrine can offer a basis for constructing an improved approach to
corporate knowledge attribution. They answer the metaphysical
question of where to look for corporate knowledge—in the knowl-
edge of employees, whether singly or collectively.328 In order for
collective knowledge to add much to respondeat superior, it has to
allow judges to attribute not only actual knowledge states of
employees, but also inferences from those states. That is how judges
in fact use the doctrine.329 However, as applied, the doctrine does not
build in any limits about how many and what kinds of inferences to
attribute. Attributing them all, as I argued, subverts optimal deter-
rence and retribution. Using some smaller subset of inferences could
strike a happy balance.
The basic problem could be stated in terms of what logicians call
“inferential distance,” or how logically remote an inference is from
a set of epistemic states.330 One way to characterize inferential
distance is objectively in terms of the number of logical steps it
takes to get from some premises to a conclusion. Solving x = 2 + 3
requires fewer steps than solving 4x = x^5 + 3x^3, so the inferential
distance for the latter would be greater on this objective account.
The problem for the objective account is that it fails to make room
for the significant subjective aspect to inferential distance. The
remoteness of an inference depends not only on the inference itself,
but also on the expertise and other capacities of the reasoner.
327. See supra Part II.B.
328. See supra Part II.A.
329. See supra Part II.B.
330. See Duncan A. Sabien, Idea Inoculation + Inferential Distance, MEDIUM (July 27,
2018), https://medium.com/@ThingMaker/idea-inoculation-inferential-distance-848836a07a5b
[https://perma.cc/W8KZ-ZH5W].
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Solving x = 2 + 3 is simple for most adults, and probably involves
just one step. But to a six-year-old, it is a complex process, involving
fingers and counting and recounting. Solving 4x = x^5 + 3x^3 would
be a long process for most people, but quite facile for many mathe-
maticians. The subjective characterization of inferential distance
builds in these individualizing considerations. It has the sort of
case-by-case adaptability that the functional account of corporate
knowledge needs. Subjective inferential distance is a function of two
variables: how effortful the inference is for the individual and how
obvious. I discuss these in detail below.
Cast in terms of inferential distance, the crucial questions for
moving forward on corporate knowledge are: When is an inference
“near” enough to the aggregate knowledge of corporate employees
such that it would make criminal-justice sense to attribute the
inference to the corporation?331 And when is it too “distant”? The line
should include enough inferences to account for cases where liability
would promote optimal deterrence and retribution, but it should
exclude inferences when liability would net social disutility or would
be unjust.
A. Insights from Collective Epistemology
One natural place to start looking for a suitable theory of corpo-
rate knowledge is social epistemology, that is the study of knowl-
edge in groups. Social epistemologists have yet to consider the
specific question of inferential distance for groups, and they tend to
focus on groups much smaller than the modern business corpora-
tion.332 However, they have staked out some foundational positions
on group knowledge that could help get the analysis started.333
331. I have Paul Gowder to thank for this helpful recasting of the problem.
332. Collective epistemologists also do not adequately distinguish, as respondeat superi-
or does, between the different “roles” individuals play, as members of the group and as indi-
viduals with lives outside the group. While all individual employees of a corporation may
know/believe that Russia tampered with the 2016 U.S. election, they know/believe this only
in their individual roles, not in their work capacity. The law would deem it improper, and I
agree, to conclude that the employer corporation knew/believed the same.
333. In a recent article, Jennifer Lackey offered a taxonomy of positions in collective episte-
mology. I take my framework from her. See Jennifer Lackey, What Is Justified Group Belief?,
125 PHIL. REV. 341, 342-43 (2016).
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Views in collective epistemology can be divided roughly into
deflationary accounts and inflationary accounts. Deflationary ac-
counts, of which there are a few varieties,334 have some resemblance
to respondeat superior. According to them, a group’s knowledge of
some fact is to be understood in terms of some subset of the mem-
bers of the group knowing the same fact.335 However, whereas under
respondeat superior knowledge by just one member is sufficient,
most deflationary social epistemologists call for something more
demanding. For example, Jennifer Lackey’s recent “group epistemic
agent account” requires that “[a] significant percentage” of its mem-
bers know a fact in order for a group to know it.336 So long as that
percentage must be above zero, it is too high for present purposes.
Deflationary accounts would only exacerbate the shortcomings of
respondeat superior. In Bank of New England, even if some em-
ployee knew that the currency reports needed filing, the bank would
still not count as knowing on Lackey’s account unless enough other
employees also knew it.337
A suitable account of corporate knowledge must instead be some
form of inflationary account.338 According to this approach, a group
may know some propositions over and above those the individuals
in the group know.339 Frederick Schmitt offers a version of the most
widely accepted inflationary account.340 In Schmitt’s theory, a group
can know some proposition that none of its members knows if that
proposition is justified by a reason that all of the group’s members
334. See Fabrizio Cariani, Judgment Aggregation, 6 PHIL. COMPASS 22, 22-24 (2011);
Christian List & Philip Pettit, Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result, 18
ECON. & PHIL. 89, 89-91 (2002); Christian List, Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A
Judgment Aggregation Perspective, 2 EPISTEME 25, 25, 27 (2005). 
335. See Cariani, supra note 334, at 23-24; List & Pettit, supra note 334, at 90-92; List,
supra note 334, at 27.
336. See Lackey, supra note 333, at 381.
337. See United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1987); Lackey,
supra note 333, at 381.
338. See MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 237-314 (1989); Deborah Tollefsen, Group
Testimony, 21 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 299, 301-02, 306, 308 (2007); Deborah Perron Tollefsen,
Wikipedia and the Epistemology of Testimony, 6 EPISTEME 8, 11-12 (2009).
339. See GILBERT, supra note 338, at 306; Tollefsen, Group Testimony, supra note 338, at
306-08; Tollefsen, Wikipedia, supra note 338, at 11-12.
340. Frederick F. Schmitt, Socializing Epistemology: An Introduction Through Two Sample
Issues, in SOCIALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY: THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 1-27
(Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 1994).
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would be willing to accept as the group’s reason to believe the prop-
osition.341 This is a step in the right direction. Schmitt’s account,
were it developed into a doctrine of corporate knowledge, would
move beyond some of the limitations of respondeat superior by
treating groups as though they know some facts unknown by any
employee—those inferable from reasoning all employees would
accept.342
Yet Schmitt’s account does not go far enough. Premising any
collective mental state on what every person in a 100,000-member
corporation would accept would most likely yield a very small, if not
empty, set. In Bank of New England, none of the individual mem-
bers could endorse reasons sufficient to establish that the bank had
a reporting obligation; none knew enough to endorse such a rea-
son.343 None knew that the transactions totaled over $10,000, and
those that knew about the transactions knew nothing about the
legal reporting requirements.344 This is a common sort of scenario
that arises in complex groups where members play distinct and dif-
ferent roles, e.g., in Bank of New England, customer facing roles
versus compliance roles.345
The inadequacy of Schmitt’s view for corporate knowledge only
deepens upon considering that individuals with different corporate
roles have varying training and expertise. In many criminal cases,
quite sophisticated knowledge is at issue, for example, economic
facts in securities fraud or facts of environmental science in emis-
sions cases. It seems counterintuitive to limit corporate knowledge
to the lowest common denominator—the most sophisticated eco-
nomic or environmental reason all employees would endorse. The
likely result would be that no large corporations would know any
technically sophisticated facts. Such a limitation would allow corpo-
rations to insulate themselves from attribution of all but the most
primitive inferences by hiring one untrained summer intern.
The problem with Schmitt’s inflationary account for current pur-
poses is that it is not yet a functional account. It advances a single
341. See id. at 265-66.
342. See id.
343. See United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 848 (1st Cir. 1987).
344. Id.
345. See id. at 856 (“Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements
of specific duties and operations into smaller components.”).
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test for all knowledge and all corporations.346 A functional account
needs different resources that vary with context; these are effort
and obviousness.
B. Effort as a Relevant Variable
Effort is a measure of how difficult an inference is to make. It
differs from person to person and inference to inference. For indi-
viduals, effort in reasoning is a familiar experience. Some problems
challenge us, even if we know in advance all the premises from
which we could deduce the solution. Challenging problems require
time, diagrams, and a blackboard. They may also require psycholog-
ical and intellectual struggle as we juggle multiple premises and
complex chains of reasoning. These are all indicators for how
effortful an inference is for a person. Adding two and three requires
minimal effort for most people, though it can be more demanding for
children and the mentally impaired. The sum at the start of this
Article ($1.61, $2.37, and $0.96) requires a bit more: for most adults,
a small napkin, a pen, and working through some simple arithmetic.
For some savants, these tools would be unnecessary and the sum
would come effortlessly to them. Solving 4x = x^5 + 3x^3 is probably
more effortful for everyone: a sheet of paper, more writing, recalling
a distant memory of polynomial algebraic rules, and correspondingly
more meticulous proof-checking.
A straightforward corporate analogue for effort is easy to come by:
cost. Corporations do not experience intellectual struggle347 or have
hands to push pens over paper,348 but they can pay people to push
and struggle on their behalf. The relevant cost is what I referred to
above as the cost of compliance.349 The relative effort required to
make an inference could be measured by how much it would cost to
346. See generally Schmitt, supra note 340.
347. See Rita C. Manning, Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Personhood, 3 J. BUS.
ETHICS 77, 80 (1984) (“Corporations do not have emotions.”); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The
Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through the
Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 938 (2005).
348. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981) (A
corporation has “no body” (quoting Lord Chancellor Baron Thurlow)).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 255-96.
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design, implement, and run a compliance program that would gath-
er the relevant information from personnel and process it in a way
that puts a corporate employee in a position to know the inference.
The higher that cost, the greater the required effort.
The amount of effort it would take any particular corporation to
make any particular inference is specific to each case. To make the
inference, a corporation would have to gather and process the rele-
vant information. Information can be more or less cost-intensive to
collect. Some types of information may be more dispersed across
multiple employees, while other information may be concentrated
among a few employees. Some qualitative information may require
a lot of labor to gather, while other quantitative information may
lend itself to automation. Effort is also something that will vary over
time, likely decreasing as compliance technology advances and
compliance firms develop solutions for recurring informational
needs in particular industries.350
Idiosyncratic properties of specific corporations also impact the
effort they must expend for inferences. Larger corporations will like-
ly have more information (effort increasing) to gather and process
before making an inference. However, they may also benefit from
efficiencies of scale (effort decreasing), with compliance systems that
can perform double-duty by tracking and processing different types
of information.351 A corporation’s industry and complexity are impor-
tant effort-impacting variables too.352 Both affect what sort of
information must be gathered and how hard it is to collect. Even
much more idiosyncratic features of the corporation can be relevant,
such as its previous compliance history and existing compliance
infrastructure. A corporation with less sophisticated compliance
mechanisms and less experienced compliance personnel will, like a
beginning mathematician solving a difficult problem, have to
expend more effort to get new compliance programs in place to make
inferences.353
350. Laufer, supra note 18, at 396-97 (“With a convergence in next generation machine
learning technology, global compliance standards, and even rudimentary evaluation science,
longstanding questions about how to monitor, surveil, and measure compliance effectiveness
will be addressed in ways that also very efficiently reduce costs.”). 
351. See id.
352. See LAUFER, supra note 267, at 72, 84-85, 92.
353. See, e.g., Laufer, supra note 18, at 393-94 (describing JPMorgan’s extensive
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C. Obviousness as a Relevant Variable
Unlike effort, which is a fully individualized inquiry, obviousness
is more objective. The obviousness of an inference is a matter of
whether it is “easily perceived or understood.”354 Obviousness
measures how apparent an inference is to a reference class of
reasoners. As such, it depends on characteristics of the inference
and the capacities of the reference class, but not directly on the
characteristics of the individual tasked with making the inference.
An inference might not be obvious to some particular individual, but
nonetheless be obvious for her because it is obvious to the reference
class. The answer to 2 + 3 is obvious for any unimpaired adult, even
if, for some reason, some particular unimpaired adult is having
trouble seeing it. Obviousness is more objective than effort because
it has a reference class beyond any single reasoner.
The use of reference classes is familiar from another important
concept in criminal law: reasonableness.355 Conduct can be unrea-
sonable even if the particular individual engaging in it disagrees.356
This is because reasonableness depends on what other people find
reasonable. The analogy to reasonableness illustrates some impor-
tant limits on who the relevant reference class includes. What
counts as reasonable conduct for a police officer in the field is
different from what most ordinary people may find reasonable.
Instead, it depends on how other police officers, given their training
and background, assess situations and respond.357 Reasonableness
compliance department).
354. Obvious, OXFORD ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
obvious [https://perma.cc/Q8S7-9MSW] (“Easily perceived or understood; clear, self-evident,
or apparent.”).
355. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 327-34
(2013); Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over the Subjectivity/Objectivity
Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33, 36 (2008) (“[A] majority of jurisdictions adopt a standard
[of reasonableness] that is both objective and subjective (a ‘hybrid’ standard).”); Paul H.
Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1987).
356. Christopher Jackson, Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances, 50 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 651, 654-55 (2013) (“This ‘objective’ standard [of reasonableness] eschews a purely
subjective inquiry; rather than asking what the defendant actually did, it sets out a
hypothetical reasonable person and asks, under the circumstances the defendant was faced
with, how she would act.” (footnote omitted)).
357. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[I]n determining whether the officer acted
reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
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for a child can be lower than it is for other people since it depends
on how children of a similar age conduct themselves.358 The
obviousness of an inference does not depend on whether it is obvious
to everyone else. Rather, obviousness depends on whether others in
a reference class of relevantly similar people would make the same
inference.
Consequently, the obviousness of an inference for a corporation
depends on two things: the attributes of the corporation that define
the reference class and what portion of corporations in that
reference class would make the inference. As to the first, some
promising suggestions are available. The Sentencing Guidelines
offer a conception of “effective compliance”359 that looks in part to
the compliance programs of corporations that are a similar “size”
and in the same “industry.”360 William Laufer’s “constructive
model”361 of corporate mental states would add “complexity, func-
tionality, and structure” as pertinent variables.362 One could supple-
ment the list further, as appropriate, with reference to things such
as geographic location, company age, history of misconduct, etc.363
With the reference class in hand, the obviousness inquiry turns
to the performance of peer corporations in the class. Supposing a
corporation has employees who know some facts, the question of
whether an inference from those facts is obvious becomes: do
corporations in the reference class have informational mechanisms
in place that, if their employees knew similar facts, would put an
employee in a position to know the inference? The answer to this
question gives a sense of whether peer corporations have the sorts
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”).
358. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“If the actor is a
child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a
reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.”).
359. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
360. Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. 2(A).
361. Laufer, supra note 202, at 651.
362. Id. at 701; see also Diane Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational
Behavior, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1377, 1388-96 (1982).
363. I have elsewhere questioned whether Laufer’s approach could serve as a general
theory of corporate mens rea, as he intends it to be. See Diamantis, supra note 11, at 2069-71.
For characterizing obviousness, however, something like Laufer’s approach could work well.
The question of inferential obviousness does not need a grand theory of corporate mens rea.
Obviousness ultimately turns on what individual employees would be in a position to know.
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of compliance programs needed to make the inference at issue. The
greater proportion of peer corporations that do, the more obvious the
inference.
D. Summary of the Account
The functional account is now simple to state: corporations know
anything any of their employees know, within the scope of their
employment, and everything that is inferable, but not too distant,
from what employees know. The root issue is whether an inference
from knowledge held by employees is too distant to hold a corpora-
tion liable for knowing it. By giving an account of inferential
distance for corporations, the functional account developed here has
more sophisticated tools for striking a balance between the all or
nothing approaches of current law. The defining features and con-
cepts of the account are as follows:
Inference: Drawing on the knowledge attribution mechanism of
respondeat superior, a corporation makes an inference from
some facts when there is an employee who, within the scope of
her employment, knows the inferred conclusion.364
Inferential Distance: The distance of an inference for a corpora-
tion depends on two variables: effort and obviousness. Greater
effort increases inferential distance. Greater obviousness
decreases inferential distance.365
Effort: The effort it would take for a particular corporation to
make a particular inference is measured by the cost of designing,
implementing, and running information systems that would
allow the corporation to make that inference.366
Obviousness: The obviousness of an inference for a corporation
depends on the proportion of corporate peers who have informa-
tion systems in place capable of making a relevantly similar
inference.367
364. See supra Part IV.
365. See supra Part IV.
366. See supra Part IV.B.
367. See supra Part IV.C.
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Attributing Knowledge of Inferences: A corporation should be
held to know an inference (even if it claims no employee actually
knew it) when, and only when, the inferential distance is not too
great.368
The logical structure of the functional account—balancing
individualizing (effort) and generalizing (obviousness) factors—is
familiar throughout the law. Generally speaking, a “‘subjective
standard’ connotes that [a person’s] conduct is judged with reference
alone to his qualities[, and] an ‘objective standard’ [connotes that]
legal consequences follow without regard to them.”369 Under this
terminology, effort is a purely “subjective” standard, depending only
on features of the individual corporation whose knowledge is at
issue. Obviousness is an “objective” standard since it turns on what
a reference class of corporations would infer, rather than what the
individual corporation did infer. A balance of subjective and objec-
tive considerations is characteristic of the pervasive reasonableness
standard in torts,370 contracts,371 search and seizure,372 and ineffec-
tive assistance.373
Yet the functional account for corporate knowledge should be
firmly distinguished as more demanding than a mere reason-
ableness standard. To see how and why, it is important to notice
that the functional account offers a standard rather than a rule
368. See supra Part IV.
369. Seavey, supra note 80, at 4.
370. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The
standard which the community demands must be an objective and external one, rather than
that of the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular individual. It must be the same
for all persons, since the law can have no favorites; and yet allowance must be made for some
of the differences between individuals, the risk apparent to the actor, his capacity to meet it,
and the circumstances under which he must act.”).
371. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1033 (1985) (“[T]he Restatement [(Second) of Contracts] actually straddles the subjective-
objective divide [in its handling of contracts made under threat].” ).
372. See United States v. Diaz, 503 F.2d 1025, 1026 (3d Cir. 1974) (“‘Real suspicion’
justifying the initiation of a strip search is subjective suspicion supported by objective,
articulable facts.” (quoting United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir.
1970))).
373. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 344 (1983) (“The ‘information available’ language is
expressly designed to focus a reviewing court’s attention not only on the trial attorney’s
subjective state of knowledge, but on the objective issue of what information was reasonably
within the capacity of the attorney to obtain.”).
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for attributing knowledge to corporations. Effort and obviousness
come in degrees. Inferences can be more or less costly and more or
less widespread among peers.374 Consequently, they can be more or
less effortful and obvious, respectively. As the effort and obvious-
ness thresholds for attributing knowledge are adjusted up or down,
so is the demandingness of the standard for attributing knowledge.
In order for the functional account to be an account of knowledge
and not of reasonableness, there are boundaries below which the
effort and obviousness thresholds should not dip. A reasonableness
inquiry would ask what an average corporation would have in-
ferred and how much effort an average corporation would have
expended.375 But knowledge must be more demanding than reason-
ableness.376 While reasonableness may be defined in terms of what
mere majorities of a reference class would do,377 obviousness allows
for only limited disagreement among the reference class. For an
inference to be obvious, some significant supermajority of the
reference class must have been in a position to make it.378 While
reasonableness may ask what inference some modest effort would
have uncovered, attributing knowledge of an inference requires
relative effortlessness.
As I discuss next, the adjustability of the functional account—that
its effort and obviousness thresholds can be dialed up or down—is
one of its chief advantages. By balancing “subjective” effort and
“objective” obviousness, the law can draw an efficient and retribu-
tively appropriate line between which inferences corporations know
and which they do not.
374. See supra note 330 and accompanying text (discussing the basic problem of “inferential
distance”).
375. See discussion supra Parts IV.B-C.
376. Warren Seavey made a similar point with respect to individuals. See Seavey, supra
note 80, at 21 (“Were this otherwise and were persons charged with knowledge of all that
which they would have acquired with reasonable effort or average mentality, one who attends
a medical college only to find at the end that he has been too lazy or stupid to become a phy-
sician, would go through life burdened with a liability based upon the knowledge of the
average physician.”).
377. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 269 (1996)
(“[R]easonableness is defined by reference to what a statistical majority of persons would
do.”).
378. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the factors to consider when analyzing obviousness).
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V. EVALUATING THE FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT
Even at first glance, the functional account has the clear upper
hand over present doctrine. It strikes a promising middle path be-
tween the extremes of respondeat superior and collective knowledge.
Because it allows for attribution of some inferences, it addresses the
disqualifying limitation of respondeat superior, which does not hold
corporations accountable for dispersed knowledge or effortless and
obvious inferences therefrom.379 Because it does not allow for the
attribution of all inferences, it does not risk treating corporations as
though they are logically omniscient, as does the collective knowl-
edge doctrine.380 The functional account therefore holds the prospect
of striking a balance between these two doctrinal poles.
A further advantage of the functional account is that it is
functional. Respondeat superior and the collective knowledge doc-
trine apply in the same way to all knowledge and all corporations,
regardless of important differences among them.381 The functional
account molds itself to context. As discussed above, inferential dis-
tance is a function of effort and obviousness, which in turn depends
on features of the corporate defendant, the sort of information at
issue, and the practices of corporate peers.382
To put the functional account into effect, courts would need in-
formation on three variables: effort, obviousness, and what infer-
ential distance is “too” far for criminal justice purposes. Expert
witnesses should be able to provide testimony about effort and
obviousness. There is a robust market for compliance consultants.383
Experts knowledgeable about the compliance industry could provide
data about what sort of compliance program, and at what cost,
would put an employee in a position to know the inference at
379. See supra Part II.A.
380. See supra Part II.B.
381. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (“Respondeat superior.... applies the same
unflinching conditions in every context.”); supra note 180 and accompanying text (“[T]he
collective knowledge doctrine ... lacks the necessary nuance.”).
382. See supra Part IV.
383. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 181, at 348 (“Corporate compliance programs and
related services marketed by lawyers are now a big growth industry. This is not likely to
change in the near future.”).
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issue.384 Similarly, experts knowledgeable about compliance prac-
tices among corporate peers could testify as to how pervasive that
sort of compliance program is. The third variable, when an inference
is too effortful or too unobvious, is a question of criminal justice for
policymakers. I discuss below how policymakers should go about
coming to an answer from the perspectives of deterrence and ret-
ribution, and how the functional account could serve both goals.385
In what follows, it is important to bear in mind that whatever line
is drawn, it should remain appropriate to knowledge, rather than
some lesser mens rea such as recklessness or negligence.386
A. Optimal Deterrence
The functional account has the potential to get closer to optimal
deterrence than respondeat superior and collective knowledge. The
crucial feature of the functional account for purposes of optimal
deterrence is that it is adjustable. Whether any given application of
the functional account hits on the socially efficient attribution
depends on the three variables: effort, obviousness, and inferential
distance. As mentioned above, the government has some power to
adjust these variables over time. If the functional account generates
inefficient results with respect to any particular type of knowledge,
it can be made efficient by tweaking the variables. For example,
inferential distance depends in part on industry compliance practice
among corporate peers, and this is something the government can
influence.
Government authorities have various tools they can use to shift
industry compliance norms. Among the more controversial mech-
anisms, prosecutors can use charging decisions387 and deferred
384. See, e.g., Codes and Compliance Expert Witnesses, FORENSISGROUP, https://www.
forensisgroup.com/expert-witness/codes-and-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/BAM2-7Q8T].
385. See infra Parts V.A-B.
386. See infra Parts V.A-B.
387. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and
U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/
legacy/2010/04/11/chargingcorps.PDF [https://perma.cc/W3J3-DB5V] (“[C]orporations are
likely to take immediate remedial steps when one is indicted for criminal conduct that is
pervasive throughout a particular industry, and thus an indictment often provides a unique
opportunity for deterrence on a massive scale.”).
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prosecution agreements388 to regulate corporate compliance. There
are also more palatable tools available that do not rely on the heavy
hand of the criminal law. Regulators can shift industry practice
through their administrative lawmaking, enforcement decisions,
and informal guidance.389 Congress can do the same with a variety
of statutory tools such as setting civil liability standards390 or
offering tax incentives/penalties.391
When industry compliance practices change, so does the obvious-
ness of inferences that the compliance practice implicates. Shifting
industry practice should also have peripheral effects on inferential
effort. As new compliance technology develops to address particular
sets of problems and comes into widespread use, the cost of design-
ing and implementing programs based on that technology should go
down.392 By nudging industry practice, the government can tweak
inferential distance and expand (or contract, if necessary) what
counts as corporate knowledge under the functional approach.
The functional account can also keep pace with the shifting
balance between compliance and crime. Scholars predict that as
compliance professionals begin to take advantage of technological
developments—such as automation, big data, and artificial intel-
ligence—the costs of compliance will decrease significantly.393 As far
388. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through
Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 329 (2017).
389. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 41 (2008) (“The rolling best-practices rulemaking approach
suggests a mechanism for harnessing regulation to change the ground rules by which industry
operates.”).
390. See, e.g., Patricia B. Hsue, Lessons from United States v. Stein: Is the Line Between
Criminal and Civil Sanctions for Illegal Tax Shelters a Dot?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 903, 942
(2008) (“Civil sanctions are a superior method for regulating the tax shelter industry.”).
391. See, e.g., Roberta F. Mann, Controlling the Environmental Costs of Obesity, 47 ENVTL.
L. 695, 731 (2017) (“Income tax changes could be designed to incentivize healthy behavior and
penalize a food industry that creates junk food addicts. While potential increases to the tax
liability of food producers may not be as salient to consumers as a food excise tax, it may be
salient enough to cause reformulation of food products.”).
392. See Katelyn Conlon, 4 Key Benefits of Compliance Technology, CONVERCENT (July 1,
2015), https://www.convercent.com/blog/4-key-benefits-of-compliance-technology [https://
perma.cc/358R-3LR3].
393. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 396 (“[T]he costs of [corporate] self-regulation will likely
decrease in the intermediate term.... The migration toward the digitalization of compliance,
algorithm-based large data aggregation, increasingly sophisticated compliance data analytics
and enterprise wide Governance, Risk, and Compliance ... systems, will soon replace clunky
and dated legacy systems and software.”).
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as respondeat superior and the collective knowledge doctrine are
concerned, this development would have no effect. But deterrence
theorists should care. A reduction in the costs of compliance would
mean that increased levels of compliance would be socially opti-
mal.394 The functional account would incentivize corporations to
increase compliance activity as compliance costs shrink. A reduction
in the costs of compliance would entail a reduction in the effort
required to make an inference, thereby increasing the likelihood
that a corporation would be treated as knowing it.395 The net result
of the functional account would be to capitalize—in a way respon-
deat superior and collective knowledge cannot—on the crime-
preventing efficiencies of improved and cheaper compliance tech-
nology.
The issue of when inferential distance is too great for knowledge
attribution is a question of criminal justice. Policymakers who wish
to prioritize the efficiency concerns of optimal deterrence could, in
theory, calculate a numerical value for inferential distance and spec-
ify an efficient cutoff. One concern with this approach, however,
would be that the efficient cutoff might compromise criminal law’s
retributive goals, discussed next.396 Since the functional account has
three leverage points—obviousness, effort, and limits on inferential
distance—policymakers should be able to triangulate to an appro-
priate balance between retributive and deterrent objectives.
It is doubtful that policymakers would ever have enough data to
know precisely what level of deterrence is optimal. So the functional
account would likely rest on individualized in-court determinations
of when inferential distance is “too great” to permit knowledge attri-
bution.397 This is not a shortcoming particular to the functional
account. It is a general limitation of optimal deterrence as a theory
of criminal justice; optimal deterrence is elusive.398 Achieving the
precise point of optimal deterrence requires full information about
394. See id. at 396-97 (discussing how compliance technology can reduce costs while
enhancing transparency); Conlon, supra note 392 (explaining how compliance technology can
help industry actors reduce their own risk).
395. See supra Part IV.B.
396. See discussion infra Part V.B.
397. See supra Part IV.
398. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 210, at 977 (arguing that optimal deterrence is
impossible because it requires complex knowledge of a large number of factors, and that
complete knowledge of these factors is impossible).
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incentives and social welfare,399 and this is something that econo-
mists concede will never be available.400
Policymakers could fill in some numerical details of the functional
account on the basis of available information to approximate opti-
mal deterrence. Whether doing so makes sense would depend on
whether the social benefits of a more precise account outweigh the
social costs associated with gathering the information and passing
legislation.401 The functional account allows for experimentation
that could be a valuable source of information for policymakers
should the balance of costs and benefits favor acquiring it. When
future data is generated as attempted approximations are imple-
mented, the required balance between effort and obviousness and
the thresholds for knowledge attribution can be refined.402 Current
doctrine lacks even this basic feature since it inflexibly treats all
corporate knowledge alike.
The functional account does bring with it two costs that
respondeat superior and the collective knowledge doctrine do a good
job of minimizing: administrative costs and uncertainty costs.403
Lower administrative costs are preferable, all else being equal.404
Administrative costs refer to the costs associated with applying a
legal rule or standard to particular cases.405 One major component
is the cost associated with gathering the facts needed to apply the
399. Id.
400. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1243 (1985) (“Realistically, the courts can-
not obtain perfect information about parties and their acts.”).
401. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
71-74 (1983).
402. See James L. Kenkel, An Iterative Technique for Finding Efficient Trade-Offs Between
Variables in Economic Models, in MODELING AND SIMULATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH
PITTSBURGH MODELING AND SIMULATION CONFERENCE 1515 (William G. Vogt & Marlin H.
Mickle eds. 1970).
403. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18-19 (1960).
404. See also David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public
Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 888 (1984) (“From a utilitarian
standpoint, functional productivity is maximized when the sum of all accident costs—
including injury losses, avoidance costs, and administrative costs—is minimized.”).
405. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 25, 27, 122 (1987); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 741 (1996) (“These costs consist of the
public and private costs associated with settled or litigated lawsuits and the costs of bar-
gaining to avoid the suboptimal outcome a rule would produce.”).
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rule or standard.406 The facts that judges and juries need under cur-
rent doctrine are relatively simple. They mostly just need evidence
showing what a corporate defendant’s employees knew.407 The
functional account has greater administrative costs. In addition to
evidence of what employees knew, courts would also need evidence
from which they could infer the effort and obviousness of any rel-
evant inferences.408 This would likely require advocates to call upon
expert witnesses,409 who can quickly inflate administrative costs.410
Even after all the relevant facts are in hand, moving to the func-
tional account would introduce new uncertainty costs. As a general
rule, uncertainty as to liability introduces inefficiency,411 especial-
ly in the corporate context.412 Preparing for the uncertain pros-
pect of liability is harder,413 in part because it may lead potential
406. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, The Mounting Costs of Internal Investigations, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK, (Mar. 5, 2012, 11:07 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/the-mounting-
costs-of-internal-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/WF5B-M688] (reporting that Avon spent
over $200 million on internal investigations between 2009 and 2011).
407. See supra Part II.A (requiring evaluation of employees’ mental state); supra Part II.B
(explaining that under the collective knowledge doctrine, anything known by any and all
employees can be attributed to the corporation).
408. See supra Part IV.B (explaining that effort requires case-by-case examination of the
costs of implementing compliance programs); see also supra Part IV.C (explaining that obvi-
ousness requires a determination of the attributes of the corporation’s “reference class” among
other things).
409. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1182 (“We call expert
witnesses to testify about matters that are beyond the ordinary understanding of lay people
(that is both the major practical justification and a formal legal requirement for expert testi-
mony), and then we ask lay judges and jurors to judge their testimony. This is a very general
problem.”).
410. See Marc Davis, For an Expert Witness, Consider Reputation, Location, and Cost,
ABA J. (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/choosing_expert_witness
[https://perma.cc/4A4J-L6VS] (reporting that the cost of an expert witness may be well over
$100,000, depending on the expertise of the witness).
411. See Andrew Morrison Stumpff, The Law Is a Fractal: The Attempt to Anticipate
Everything, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 649, 676 (2013) (“The usual operating assumption seems to
have been that because uncertainty is costly, the existence of a rule for every situation will
always reduce transaction costs.”).
412. See Wesley D. Markham, Healthcare Reform’s Mandatory Medical Loss Ratio:
Constitutionality, Policy, and Implementation, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 139, 143 (2011) (“Uncertainty
is costly, especially for businesses that must structure their operations to conform to a web
of government regulations.”); Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and
Economics of Possession, 86 VA. L. REV. 535, 565 (2000) (“Uncertainty is costly in itself.”).
413. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 327 (1994) (“[I]ndividuals may find it easier (cheaper) to become informed
under rules.”).
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defendants to take unnecessary precautions.414 Then, once a claim
of liability arises, resolving it becomes more difficult because
uncertainty can lead the parties to have different predictions about
the outcome.415 Since respondeat superior and the collective
knowledge doctrine apply in the same mechanical way to all cor-
porations, the results they call for are relatively predictable. The
functional account brings uncertainty with it since it asks courts to
balance effort and obviousness for each corporate defendant before
attributing inferential knowledge.416
The administrative and uncertainty tradeoffs between current
doctrine and the functional account are the familiar tradeoffs of
using rules versus standards.417 Rules generally “abstract a few rele-
vant facts from the welter of circumstances of each actual case and
make the selected facts legally determinative.”418 Respondeat
superior and the collective knowledge doctrine operate with rule-
like automaticity since they trigger knowledge attribution based on
the facts of what employees know and what is inferable there-
from.419 The functional account is more standard-like, since it would
require adjudicators to evaluatively balance effort and obviousness
to determine when an inference is too far for attribution.420
414. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1688 (1976) (“Certainty, on the other hand, is valued for its effect on the citizenry:
if private actors can know in advance the incidence of official intervention, they will adjust
their activities in advance to take account of them.”).
415. See Diver, supra note 401, at 74 (“The cost to both the regulated population and
enforcement officials of applying a rule tends to increase as the rule’s opacity or inaccessibility
increases. Transparent and accessible rules can reduce the number of disputes that arise and
simplify their resolution by causing the parties’ predictions of the outcome to converge.”).
416. See Mark A. Kressel, Contractual Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 116
YALE L.J. 412, 436 (2006) (“Any balancing test solution will also leave in place most of the
agency costs associated with unpredictability in litigation and judicial error.”).
417. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 562-67 (1992).
418. Posner, supra note 412, at 565.
419. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382 (1985)
(“Corresponding to the two parts of a directive, there are two sets of oppositions that consti-
tute the rules v. standards dichotomy: The trigger can be either empirical or evaluative, and
the response can be either determined or guided.”). Different characterizations of the distinc-
tion between rules and standards are available. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 417, at 560
(“This Article will adopt such a definition, in which the only distinction between rules and
standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after
individuals act.”).
420. See Kaplow, supra note 417, at 560.
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The choice between rules and standards can be viewed economi-
cally by comparing the costs and benefits flowing from each.421
“Rules ... are said to be appropriate when certainty, uniformity,
stability, and security are highly valued, whereas standards are
seen as more appropriate when flexibility, individualization, open-
endedness, and dynamism are important.”422 Recall that part of the
problem with current doctrine is that it fails to take account of the
wide differences between corporations and industries.423 “[A]n
imperfect fit ... resulting in some outcomes that are erroneous from
the standpoint of the substantive principle” is a predictable feature
of using any rule.424 But if the arguments in Part III are correct,
then the gap between current doctrine and perfect fit is very wide
indeed.425 Respondeat superior and the collective knowledge doctrine
drive corporations to the undesirable poles of a spectrum between
more unacceptable levels of corporate misconduct and over-
investment in compliance, respectively. Given the current massive
social costs of both,426 the administrative costs and uncertainty costs
of getting better tailored outcomes under the functional account
should be easy to justify. Though expert compliance witnesses would
be an additional administrative cost under the functional account,
the social benefits of bringing them into the picture should be no
harder to justify than where other experts in fields such as account-
ing427 or environmental science428 are a necessary aid to courts.
421. See Diver, supra note 401, at 72 (“A social utility-maximizing rulemaker would, for
any conceivable set of rule formulations, identify and estimate the social costs and benefits
flowing from each, and select the one with the greatest net social benefit.”).
422. Schlag, supra note 419, at 400; see Kennedy, supra note 236, at 1689 (“The choice of
rules as the mode of intervention involves the sacrifice of precision in the achievement of the
objectives lying behind the rules.”). 
423. See supra Part III.A.
424. See Posner, supra note 412, at 565.
425. See supra Part III.
426. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 399.
427. See Sofia Adrogúe & Alan Ratliff, Kicking the Tires After Kumho: The Bottom Line on
Admitting Financial Expert Testimony, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 431, 477 (2000).
428. See generally Kim K. Burke, The Use of Experts in Environmental Litigation: A Prac-
titioner’s Guide, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 111 (1997).
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B. Retribution
If criminal law is to satisfy its retributive goals—to satisfy “soci-
ety’s desire to see those [corporations] responsible for misconduct
punished”429—it should, to the extent possible, treat corporations as
though they know things in the same way that individual humans
do. This approach best incorporates the way people actually
determine whether to hold entitative groups like corporations
responsible.430 Evidence suggests that we are inclined to assess and
respond to collective responsibility in much the same way that we
assess and respond to the responsibility of individuals.431 Our
practice of blaming groups like corporations closely resembles the
practice of blaming individuals,432 especially insofar as our assess-
ments of responsibility depend, as they often do, on attributing
mental states, like knowledge.433 This suggests that a retributively
appropriate criminal justice system should attribute inferential
knowledge to corporate defendants, as much as possible, as though
they were ordinary natural people.434
The structure of corporate criminal law already reflects this
psychologizing perspective to some extent.435 It defines corporations
to be a type of person.436 In specifying the elements of corporate
crime, the law uses ordinary human mental states for the mens
rea.437 On a plain reading, terms such as “intent” and “knowledge”
429. Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment Matter?, 19 J.L. &
POL’Y 83, 93 (2010).
430. See id. (arguing that criminal law should be public perceptions of corporate punish-
ment); Bertram F. Malle, The Social and Moral Cognition of Group Agents, 19 J.L. & POL’Y,
95, 136 (2010) (“[T]he law must heed the concepts and criteria by which ordinary people
recognize group agents and judge their moral conduct.”).
431. See Malle, supra note 430, at 130.
432. See id. at 132 (“[G]roup agents can be blamed through the operation of the same
cognitive apparatus through which individuals are blamed.”).
433. See Daniel C. Dennett, Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology, in THE INTENTIONAL
STANCE 43, 58 (1987); Steve Guglielmo et al., At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology,
52 INQUIRY 449, 669 (2009); Tracy Isaacs, Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective
Intention, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 59, 62 (2006).
434. See Henning, supra note 429, at 93.
435. See id.
436. A corporation is an entity “having authority under law to act as a single person.”
Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2012); see 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining
“person” to include corporations).
437. See Laufer, supra note 202, at 652 (noting that the Supreme Court, when it introduced
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mean the same thing when they are used for individual people and
for corporations.438 If Congress meant something totally unlike
human knowledge when referring to corporate knowledge, it could
have used a different word or explicitly defined knowledge, as
applied to corporations, differently.
The fact that Congress and ordinary people think of corporate
knowledge as analogous to human knowledge does not make theo-
rizing a retributively appropriate account of corporate knowledge
straightforward.439 Trying to attribute inferential knowledge to
corporations as we would to ordinary people quickly becomes
complicated. Inferential distance for corporations, even within a
fiction that tries to treat them as people, must be quite unlike our
own. A large corporation’s ability to acquire and process knowledge
outpaces that of any individual human being.440 America’s seventy-
five largest corporations all have more than 100,000 employees.441
Walmart, the largest employer, has 2.2 million employees.442 That
is a lot of knowledge. What is more, much of this knowledge is spe-
cialized and technical.443 Corporations hire financial analysts,
accountants, attorneys, computer scientists, and any number of
other highly trained professionals with technical backgrounds most
people lack.444 To top it all off, these employees are collectively
capable of managing and processing this information in ways un-
attainable by individual human minds.445
While corporations may be much more sophisticated “knowers”
than natural people, they are just more extreme versions of a more
corporate criminal liability, drew on individual human mens rea; “[t]he notion of a distinct
corporate mens rea or actus reus was ignored”); William S. Laufer, Culpability and the
Sentencing of Corporations, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1049, 1085 (1992) (“Commentators who suggest
the importance of determining corporate culpability, rather than individual mens rea which
is imputed to an entity, may have underestimated how far the federal statutory law has
strayed into obscurity.”).
438. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 53 (2012) (discussing the presumption of consistent usage canon).
439. See Laufer, supra note 437, at 1089.
440. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 393.
441. See Biggest Employers, supra note 292.
442. See Company Facts, WALMART, https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/company-
facts [https://perma.cc/334G-GD3C].
443. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 393.
444. See id.
445. See id.
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familiar sort of case. The law frequently calls on people, such as
judges, jurors, and the observing public, to assess the beliefs and
knowledge of their epistemic superiors—those with more training,
education, or ability.446 This comes up frequently in the context of
professional malpractice,447 but is common in other areas of law as
well, such as Fourth Amendment stop-and-frisk cases.448 The law
asks lay jurors to assess what the expert defendant must have
known (but perhaps now disingenuously denies knowing), should
have known, or was reasonable in believing.449 Did the attorney
actually know the argument was frivolous but make it anyway?
Should the doctor have known that the redness and swelling indi-
cated an advanced infection? Was the police officer reasonable to
believe that her safety was threatened?
Since retributivists should want the law to attribute inferential
knowledge to corporations as it does to individual defendants, they
should try to adapt the law’s ordinary procedures for gauging infer-
ential distance. Grounding the procedure for corporate defendants
in the procedures used for sophisticated individual defendants
stands the best chance of assuring the former will reflect lay intui-
tions about corporate knowledge.450 As nonexperts, typical jurors
have no immediate basis for assessing the credibility of an expert’s
denial that she made some inference relevant to her expertise.451
Instead, the parties call in witnesses with the same expertise as the
defendant to testify about whether the knowledge or inference in
question would be the sort of thing the defendant could easily have
known and whether other experts would have known it.452 This
446. See Malle, supra note 430, at 136.
447. See Michael J. Polelle, Who’s on First, and What’s a Professional?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV.
205, 206 (1999) (“Once the plaintiff files an action for professional negligence, he or she must
prove the professional failed to possess and apply the knowledge, skill and ability that a
reasonably careful professional in the field would exercise under the circumstances.”). 
448. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2013) (“A police officer has probable cause
to conduct a search when the facts available to [the officer] would warrant a [person] of
reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.... All we
have required is the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent [people,] not
legal technicians, act.” (internal citations omitted)).
449. See Burke, supra note 428, at 120-21.
450. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 411.
451. See Burke, supra note 428, at 127.
452. See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3:93 (2d ed. Nov. 2018 update)
(“[P]roof of deviation from professional standards normally requires expert testimony.”); see
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gives jurors some basis for assessing an expert defendant’s credibil-
ity if she denies knowing something.453 The more obvious and less
effortful the inferential distance, the less credible the claim.
The parallel to the functional account of corporate knowledge
should be apparent. The functional account of whether a corporation
knows some inference turns on the same factors—effort and
obviousness—that factfinders use for individual experts.454 Both
respondeat superior and the collective knowledge doctrine attribute
inferences without regard to these factors.455 Respondeat superior
blocks the attribution of inferences no matter how effortless and
obvious.456 And the collective knowledge doctrine allows attribution
of them no matter how effortful and nonobvious.457 Since we know
that people assess corporate mens rea like they do individual mens
rea, both of these approaches are retributively inappropriate. The
functional account offers the best chance of giving factfinders the
tools they need to render an intuitively just verdict. Under the func-
tional account, factfinders gauge whether, in light of some back-
ground knowledge the corporation had, it “must have known” or
“cannot have known” some further inference.458
CONCLUSION: BEYOND CRIMINAL DOCTRINE
The way we attribute knowledge to corporations in criminal law
affects the sort of compliance programs corporations choose to im-
plement and the amount of corporate misconduct that results.459
Current doctrine was developed for a vastly different legal and
historical context. Both respondeat superior460 and the collective
also Joseph H. King, The Common Knowledge Exception to the Expert Testimony Requirement
for Establishing the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 51, 84 (2007)
(“[M]alpractice cases are generally resolved within the adversary system with medical ex-
perts, selected and paid by the parties, who provide the jury with opinions on the relevant
professional standards and whether they were satisfied or breached.”).
453. See, e.g., King, supra note 452, at 91.
454. See id.
455. See supra Part II.
456. See Ellis & Dow, supra note 122, at 176-77.
457. See United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1987); Lackey,
supra note 333, at 381.
458. See supra Part IV.
459. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 399.
460. See Diamantis, supra note 11, at 2054.
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knowledge doctrine461 initially arose for noncorporate, civil law
disputes, well before the true ascendency of the corporate form. It
is therefore unsurprising that they fall far short of realizing the
deterrent and retributive objectives of corporate criminal law.
Scholars too have mostly missed the mark. They are keen to theo-
rize about corporate culpability, but rarely discuss corporate
knowledge as a culpable mental state with distinct properties.462
Knowledge is importantly different from other mens rea, both in
terms of its internal logic and in how its attribution in criminal law
affects corporate incentives.
This Article has introduced tools that can give an effective
account of corporate knowledge while working within the current
doctrinal framework. It did this by focusing on the important but
overlooked distinction between what a corporation knows and what
is mere information present somewhere in the corporate structure.
The key to fine-tuning the line between what the law considers
corporate knowledge and what it considers mere information is to
focus on when the law will treat corporations as knowing facts
inferable from information known by employees. By calibrating
that line, the law can strike a balance between the excesses of
respondeat superior, which attributes no inferences, and the collec-
tive knowledge doctrine, which risks attributing them all.
I developed a framework—which I call the “functional account”—
that policymakers and courts can use for deciding when to attribute
knowledge of inferences to corporations. The two pillars of the
framework are what I called “effort”—how much it would cost a
corporation to make the inference—and “obviousness”—whether
similar corporations make similar inferences. According to the
functional account, corporations should be treated as knowing less
effortful and more obvious inferences. The functional account is
well-positioned to realize criminal law’s deterrent and retributive
aims. Since it tracks the way people naturally think about whether
corporations have culpable knowledge, it has the best chance of
punishing corporations when, and only when, such condemnation
would be retributively appropriate. Since Congress can tweak how
the functional account applies in different corporate contexts by
461. See Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 35, at 211.
462. But see Moore, supra note 317, at 797.
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using noncriminal tools to shift industry practice, the functional
account could be a powerful tool on the road to optimal deterrence.
My hope is also that the functional account will be helpful—
beyond criminal doctrine—for practitioners, as an account of how
people ordinarily think about corporate knowledge, and in other
legal settings, as an adaptable general theory of corporate scienter.
Practitioners know that whether people sympathize with a defen-
dant can affect trial463 and public opinion.464 If the current views of
cognitive scientists and psychologists are right—that people
intuitively think of corporate knowledge in the same way they think
about individual knowledge465—then the characterizations of effort
and obviousness from above are important ingredients that will
shape ordinary moral judgments. Compliance professionals looking
to manage lay opinion prospectively or attorneys trying to shape the
opinions of juries should bear in mind data about the costs of com-
pliance (effort) and the practices of peer corporations (obviousness).
Commentators have observed that the consultants who design
corporate compliance programs do not seem to have a good sense of
how much compliance is enough, and when it is too much.466 The
functional account offers a metric. Even if current doctrine is not
functional, people’s opinions about corporate innocence and guilt
are.467
As indicated at the beginning of this Article, corporate knowledge
is relevant not only in criminal law; civil and regulatory liability
often also turn on what a corporation knew.468 For example, the civil
463. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 194 (1966) (discussing
the impact of jury sympathy on the outcomes of criminal trials).
464. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion,
Installment Two: How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119,
1133 (2010) (“The court of public opinion is perhaps as important as a court of law to the
resolution of [corporate] legal controversies.”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in
an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 688 (discussing influence of public opinion on
prosecutors); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 282 n.175
(1993) (“At least in publicized cases, elected prosecutors inevitably take public opinion into
account.”).
465. See Laufer, supra note 267, at 1089.
466. See generally Kathleen M. Boozang & Simon Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring”
Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM.
J.L. & MED. 89 (2009).
467. See Diamantis, supra note 11, at 2078.
468. See supra Part II.
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provisions of the False Claims Act apply when a corporation
“knowingly presents ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment” to
the federal government.469 So, the same difficulties about what it
means for a corporation to “know” something arise in the civil and
regulatory contexts as well.470 All corporate knowledge remains, in
a sense, constructive knowledge.471 And the same doctrines—
respondeat superior and collective knowledge—push corporate
incentives inefficiently in opposite directions. Here, as for criminal
law, the flexibility of the functional account could help. By adjusting
the effort and obviousness thresholds for knowledge attribution,
lawmakers can tailor the demandingness of corporate knowledge
attribution to the needs of different areas of law. Assuming there is
an optimal point across contexts for treating corporate information
as corporate knowledge, the functional account has the tools to
reach it.
469. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).
470. See Diamantis, supra note 11, at 2088.
471. The False Claims Act itself defines knowledge constructively. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)
(defining “knowing” to mean “has actual knowledge,” “acts in deliberate ignorance” of the un-
derlying information, or “acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity” of the underlying
information).
